The Campaign of Sedan: The Downfall of the Second Empire, August-September 1870Hooper, George
History
The Campaign of Sedan: The Downfall of the Second Empire, August-September 1870
Hooper, George
Franco-Prussian War, 1870-1871; Sedan Campaign, 1870
At this moment, it should be noted, the French camps on the right
centre and right did not know that an enemy was within a long mile
of their bivouacs. The usual patrols had been sent out and had
returned—even scouts selected by the local officials for their
knowledge of the country—to report that they had not seen anybody.
Marshal Canrobert, in his evidence on the Bazaine court-martial,
expressly testifies to the fact, and adds that the first intimation
he received came from the boom of hostile guns on his left front. The
troops of Ladmirault’s Corps, encamped on both sides of Amanvillers,
were peacefully engaged in cooking their noontide meal, when General
von Manstein, who seems to have been endowed with some of the
impetuosity of his namesake, who figured in the wars of Frederick II.,
riding ahead of his corps, caught sight of the quiescent camp. The
temptation could not be withstood. From the hills near Vernéville he
could not see the troops at St. Privat, but he had been informed by
the Hessian Cavalry that the French were there. He had been formally
enjoined to attack if the enemy’s right was near La Folie; it was
much to the north of that farm; yet Manstein, unable to neglect the
opportunity of startling a negligent camp by an outburst of fire, sent
the solitary battery which had accompanied him into instant action
from a rising ground east of Vernéville. The first shot was fired at
a quarter to twelve, and its successors roused the French line from
St. Privat to the centre, for Frossard and Lebœuf seemed to have
been on the alert. General von Blumenthal, with the leading infantry
battalions, was at that time moving on the farm of Chantrenne, and
he was stopped by the lively musketry salute which greeted his men.
Manstein, seeing that his guns were too distant from their living
targets, now ordered the battery forward, and it was soon joined,
first by the divisional then by the corps artillery; the whole finally
forming a long line of fifty-four pieces, each battery having, as it
dashed up, wheeled to the right and opened fire. The movement was a
grave error, for the long rounded hill on which the batteries stood
faced south-east, offered no shelter except on its low right shoulder,
and the guns were exposed to a fire from the front, the flank, and
even from the left rear. Two batteries were slewed round to the left,
but that did not remedy the original mistake. There were no infantry
at hand to keep down the fire of the French foot, which, lurking in
the hollows, sent a hail of bullets among the guns. Committed to this
false position, the superb German artillerymen did their utmost to make
it good; but no heroism could avail against its cruel disadvantages.
General Blumenthal, indeed, had carried the Chantrenne farm, but the
enemy, at the first shot, had thrown a garrison into another homestead
named Champenois, whence the chassepots smote the front of the
batteries. The Hessians, also, had developed a powerful attack through
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