The Campaign of Sedan: The Downfall of the Second Empire, August-September 1870Hooper, George
History
The Campaign of Sedan: The Downfall of the Second Empire, August-September 1870
Hooper, George
Franco-Prussian War, 1870-1871; Sedan Campaign, 1870
position, from the Great Quarries to the farm and copse of La Folie,
impregnable, and renders it all the more difficult to comprehend how
Marshal Bazaine could have shown such manifest distrust of the fastness
which protected his left wing. The attack on St. Ruffine by Von Golz
was merely a diversion shrewdly designed to increase the Marshal’s
alarms, and its relative success shows how correctly Von Moltke
estimated his adversary’s abilities as a soldier. He reaped an ample
reward, since long before the last shot was fired in the neighbourhood
of St. Hubert, the French had been worsted at the other and distant
extremity of the vast field of battle.
_The Prussian Guard on the Centre and Left._
It may be said, indeed, that not one, but several battles were fought
on the 18th of August, in the long space between the Bois de Vaux and
the Forest of Moyœuvre. They were inter-dependent, because one mass of
combatants held fast another, and the essence of the German plan was
that three-fourths of the French Army should be nailed to the positions
they had taken up, while the remainder were crushed by the pressure of
superior forces. The original design of Von Moltke was framed on the
supposition that the French right stood near Amanvillers, and that he
would be able to fling upon an exposed flank two Corps d’Armée. Before
the error was discovered, several hours had been consumed; the Guard
had been obliged to prolong the front fighting line; only a part of
the Saxon Corps could be spared to engage in the turning movement,
and the ground which they had to traverse grew longer and longer as
the day waxed shorter. The extent of country over which the various
armies operated, and the smoke which obscured the view, prevented a
correct appreciation of the situation of affairs at a given moment,
and the German commanders were liable to be deceived, and were
deceived by appearances. The knowledge that so brief an interval of
daylight remained, and an anxiety to make the most of precious moments,
quickened the tendency to decisive action, and thus brought about the
rash and premature attack which was so destructive, and nearly proved
so fatal to the Prussian Guard.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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