The Campaign of Sedan: The Downfall of the Second Empire, August-September 1870Hooper, George
History
The Campaign of Sedan: The Downfall of the Second Empire, August-September 1870
Hooper, George
Franco-Prussian War, 1870-1871; Sedan Campaign, 1870
In his quarters at Clermont, General von Moltke still disposed of the
Meuse Army and the Bavarians in a manner which would enable him to
effect, if necessary, that concentration at Damvillers which we saw
him meditating and devising on the afternoon of the 25th, at Bar le
Duc. Thus, on the 27th, the Guard, which came up to Monfaucon, and the
4th Corps to Germonville, were each directed to throw bridges over the
Meuse, so that there should be four points of passage in case of need.
The Bavarians followed from the rear as far as Dombasle and Nixéville,
and the other Corps of the Third Army turned frankly northward, the
5th pushing its advance-guard to Sainte-Menehould. At the same time
the Saxon Corps had crossed the Meuse at Dun and established a brigade
firmly in Stenay. The cavalry had been as active and as useful as
ever. They had covered the march of the Saxon Corps by occupying Grand
Pré, Nouart, and Buzancy, coming into contact with the French at the
last-named village. General de Failly, who, early in the morning, had
moved to Bar, observed hostile cavaliers beyond the stream, and sent
Brahaut’s brigade to drive them off and seize prisoners. That brought
on a smart skirmish, during which De Failly received orders to retreat
on Brieulles; but Brahaut was driven from Buzancy by the fire of a
horse battery; and the unlucky French General made no prisoners. There
was no other rencontre during the day, but the German cavalry on all
sides rode up close to the enemy’s posts and kept the leaders well
informed. From the reports sent in, Von Moltke inferred that there
had been a pause in the French movements; at all events, that none of
their troops had crossed the Meuse; and, as he knew that the Saxons
were in Dun and Stenay, he thought himself, at length, justified in
believing it possible that he might strike MacMahon on the left bank.
Consequently, he abandoned the Damvillers plan, and sent back to
Metz the two Corps which had been detached from the blockading army.
Therefore, while the Saxons stood fast, for one day, the Bavarians were
directed to march, on the 28th, upon Varennes and Vienne le Chateau;
the Guard upon Banthéville; and the 4th Corps on Montfaucon—the general
direction for all the Corps being Vouziers, Buzancy, and Beaumont.
During that day these orders were fulfilled, each Corps duly attaining
its specified destination; the Guard and 4th Corps, before they
started, taking up the bridges thrown over the Meuse. Four divisions
of cavalry were out prying, through the mist, into every movement of
the 5th and 7th French Corps, whose left flank, it was ascertained,
was absolutely unguarded, so that the German horse looked on, and, in
some cases, were misled by the astonishing confusion displayed by the
enemy’s vacillating motions.
_Effects of MacMahon’s Counter-Orders._
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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