Inspired by the hope of closing with the enemy, the German Armies were astir at dawn, and soon long columns of men and guns were tramping steadily northward; but, for the present the narrative is concerned only with the Saxon 12th, the Prussian 4th, and Von der Tann’s Bavarians. These troops advanced through the forests, the Saxons near the Meuse, the 4th in the centre by Nouart and Belval, and the Bavarians, from their distant bivouac at Sommerance, upon and beyond Sommauthe. Now it was originally designed that the two Corps, on the right and centre, should attack simultaneously, and to insure this, each column, on arriving at the skirts of the forest, was directed to halt under cover until it had ascertained that the others on each flank had also gained the edge of the woods. But it turned out that the Saxons, from the start, were delayed by various obstacles which impeded not only the artillery, but the infantry. The leading division of the 4th Corps met with fewer obstructions on its route through Belval, and thus arrived first on the scene of action. On the line of march in the forest, intelligence was picked up which quickened its motions, and a squadron sent forward confirmed the statement that the French about Beaumont reposed in thoughtless security. The Corps Commander, Von Alvensleben I.,—for there were two who bore the name in this Army,—an officer ever ready to go forward, was present with the advance-guard of the division, and not likely to hold it back. So the soldiers advanced in silence. On approaching the open country, the Hussars in the front glided out of sight, and a company of Jägers crept towards the selvage of the wood, and, from a hillock near a farm, they saw, only six hundred paces distant, a French camp, and beyond other camps. The cavalry horses were picketed, the artillery teams had not returned from seeking water, the soldiers were either resting or employed on the routine work of a camp. What should be done? Here was an absolutely unguarded Army Corps, ignorant that an enemy was within short musket range. The divisional commander had orders to await the arrival of lateral columns, but he felt that the Frenchmen might discover his unwelcome presence at any moment. He had only a brigade on the ground, yet the temptation to seize an opportunity so unexpected, was almost irresistible. He, therefore, decided to attack as soon as his brigade could deploy, and his batteries plant themselves in a favourable place. Suddenly the men in the French camp were all in motion. General von Alvensleben inferred that the proximity of his troops had been perceived, whereas the activity displayed, as we learn from De Failly, was caused by an order to fall in before starting for Mouzon. Without waiting, however, until the battalions in rear could reach the ground, Alvensleben opened fire, and the shells bursting in their camp, gave the first warning to the French that their redoubtable adversaries were upon them.