We do not believe, as we have pointed out above, that any such determination had been arrived at by Wellington and Blücher beforehand; but, Blücher’s taking the decisive step of ordering a concentration of his army at Sombreffe, instead of at Wavre, for instance, placed Wellington, as we have just pointed out, under the necessity of ordering a concentration of his army, or a part of it, at Quatre Bras, unless he was prepared to leave his ally without support. The criticisms of Napoleon and of General Shaw-Kennedy, are, therefore, we submit, really confined to Blücher’s action. Napoleon is not considering what Wellington ought to have done _in view of the step which Blücher took in concentrating at Sombreffe_, but is only giving his opinion, that, on general principles, Quatre Bras was not the proper place of concentration for the English, just as Sombreffe was not the proper place of concentration for the Prussians, after the French were known to be advancing on Charleroi. It must be noted that Napoleon and Kennedy both assume that the two allied generals had agreed upon Sombreffe and Quatre Bras respectively.[216] If there was no such agreement, (and we think there was not any), then we cannot properly consider Wellington’s decision to concentrate at Quatre Bras except in connection with the fact that Blücher had committed himself to a battle at Ligny and needed his support. FOOTNOTES: [193] The italics are ours. But see _post_, p. 374, n. 2. [194] Supp. Desp., vol. x, p. 523; App. C, XV; _post_, pp. 374, 375, 376. [195] Chesney, p. 83, n.; p. 101; p. 131. [196] Ib., p. 101; p. 131. [197] Siborne, vol. 1., p. 40. [198] Ib., p. 102, note. [199] By a despatch sent to the Prince of Orange at Brussels from Braine-le-Comte at 10 P.M. Van Loben Sels, p. 176, note. [200] Gleig’s Life of the Duke of Wellington, p. 308. [201] Scott’s Life of Napoleon, p. 833. Paris; Galignani; 1828. [202] Maurice, pp. 344 _et seq._ (July, 1890.) _Contra_, Charras, vol. 1, pp. 132, _et seq._ [203] _Ante_, p. 80, n. 36. [204] Chesney, p. 101. [205] Kennedy, pp. 168-170. See, also, Clausewitz, chaps. 11, 15, 17. Charras, vol. 1, p. 80. Corresp., vol. 31, p. 254. [206] Kennedy, p. 171. [207] Charras, vol. 1 p. 80. [208] This is also the opinion of Clausewitz; ch. 18. [209] Charras, vol. 1, p. 83. Clausewitz, ch. 18, says “nearer Nivelles,” _i.e._, nearer than Namur is. [210] Corresp., vol. 31, p. 253. [211] Ib., p. 254. [212] Ib., p. 253. [213] Ib., p. 254. The words in brackets are in the edition of 1820, known as the “Mémoires,” but are not in the “Correspondance.” The “Mémoires” also substitute “the 17th” for “the evening of the 16th.” [214] Corresp. vol. 31, p. 255. [215] Kennedy, p. 172. [216] Corresp., pp. 195,197. Kennedy, p. 172. CHAPTER VI. THE FIFTEENTH OF JUNE: THE DUTCH-BELGIANS.