“Almost all historians” says Colonel Maurice,[227] “write as if the occupation of Quatre Bras by Prince Bernhard was a step for which he not only deserves the greatest credit, but one which in itself was sure to be of vast advantage to the English army.” In this opinion Colonel Maurice does not share. We have fully treated of this subject before.[228] All we need say here is to repeat, that the question of the suitableness of Quatre Bras as the point of concentration for the Anglo-Dutch army could not have been considered by the Duke of Wellington at this moment apart from the fact that Marshal Blücher was concentrating his army at Sombreffe; and that, when this fact was ascertained, the Duke must concentrate at Quatre Bras or abandon all hope of assisting his ally. We have also pointed out that the fact that the main French army was opposed to the Prussians constituted this case an exception to the general rule; for, in this instance, _ex hypothesi_, the Duke would encounter only those troops which Napoleon would feel himself strong enough to detach from his main body. If we are right in this contention, therefore, then the Dutch-Belgian generals,—Constant Rebecque, Perponcher, and the Prince of Saxe Weimar,—having learned the situation of the French and Prussian armies before the Duke heard of it, did what Wellington, had he known what they knew, would have ordered to be done.[229] And it may be added, that we fully concur in the commendation which has so generally been awarded to them for their prompt and vigorous action. FOOTNOTES: [227] Maurice, p. 345: July, 1890. [228] _Ante_, pp. 94 _et seq._ [229] Chesney, p. 102; Hooper, p. 84. CHAPTER VII. THE MORNING OF THE SIXTEENTH OF JUNE: WELLINGTON. The Duke of Wellington, as we have seen, did not decide on ordering a general concentration of his army at Quatre Bras until the early morning hours of the 16th of June. We have produced above two orders, both addressed to Lord Hill, written at Brussels on the morning of the 16th of June, and we have shown that the first, at any rate, was written and sent out before the Duke had made up his mind to concentrate his army at Quatre Bras. We have also, however, shown, that before he left Brussels, he did make up his mind to do this, and that orders to this effect were, no doubt, then issued. We cannot fix the hour or hours at which this was done, but it was undoubtedly before the Duke left Brussels. This last hour has been differently fixed,[230] but it was probably about half-past seven. He, then, leaving the Deputy Quarter Master General and the other heads of departments in Brussels,—[231] presumably to attend to the issuing of the orders for the concentration of the army at Quatre Bras,—rode to the latter place, where he arrived about 10 o’clock. Here he found only Perponcher’s division of Dutch-Belgian troops, under command of the Prince of Orange.