The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History: Third EditionRopes, John Codman
History
The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History: Third Edition
Ropes, John Codman
Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769-1821 -- Elba and the Hundred Days, 1814-1815; Waterloo, Battle of, Waterloo, Belgium, 1815
3. Finally, it must be said that the Duke of Wellington was not well
served by his subordinates on the day of the 15th in respect to the
transmission to him of information from the front.[246] His first news
of the attack on the Prussian lines near Thuin did not arrive till 3
P.M., although the French movement must have been pronounced some ten
or eleven hours before that hour. Charleroi was occupied by the main
French column at noon, but all the Duke had heard at 10 P.M. simply
warranted him in writing that the enemy “appeared to menace Charleroi.”
Brussels is only 35 or 36 miles from Charleroi; and by a good despatch
system news of such importance ought to have been transmitted in four
hours. If that had been done,—if Wellington had known at four or five
o’clock in the afternoon positively that the French had occupied
Charleroi in force, and if his information from Mons had arrived at
the same time, as certainly ought to have been the case,—there is
every reason to suppose that he would at once have issued orders for
the concentration of the army at Quatre Bras. The orders which he did
issue to this effect were not sent out, as we have seen, till the early
morning hours of the 16th, some nine or ten hours later than those
which we may fairly suppose he would have issued, had information of
the French movements been promptly transmitted to him. But how far the
commander-in-chief is himself responsible for such delays as this is,
of course, a question. It is and must be for him to devise efficient
methods, and to put them to the test often enough beforehand to feel
justified in relying on them in a sudden emergency. And the situation
in which the Duke of Wellington was in the month of June, 1815,
certainly would seem to have called for the utmost watchfulness and for
the taking of every precaution. It is impossible not to conclude that
he failed in these respects.
FOOTNOTES:
[237] Grenadier Guards, vol. 3, p. 15.
[238] Leeke, vol. 1, pp. 10, 11.
[239] Siborne, vol. 1, p. 90.
[240] Siborne, vol. 1, p. 102, note. Gomm, pp. 353, 354. Waterloo
Letters, pp. 23, 24. Gomm says Picton’s division left Brussels at 5
A.M., marched to Waterloo (a distance of about eleven miles), and
halted there two hours; and then at 1 P.M. resumed its march for Quatre
Bras, where it arrived at 3.30 P.M. Siborne (vol. 1, p. 102) says
that Picton arrived at a quarter before 3 P.M., having left Waterloo
about noon. As the distance is about thirteen miles, the later hour of
arrival given by Gomm is probably correct.
[241] Siborne, vol. 1, p. 103, n.
[242] Van Loben Sels, p. 232.
[243] Historical Record of the Life Guards, p. 193: 2d Ed. London;
Longmans: 1840. Bullock’s Journal; English Historical Magazine, July,
1888, p. 549.
[244] Life Guards, p. 194. Bullock, p. 549, says eight o’clock.
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