Lastly, while the Emperor expressly states in his letter to Grouchy that he estimates that the Prussians can not oppose to him a force of over forty thousand men, and while it may perhaps be inferred from his letter to Ney that he thought that that officer would meet with little or no opposition, it is to be observed that Napoleon acted in all respects as if he expected that the enemy would be found in force. Both Ney and Grouchy were explicitly directed to employ the whole of their respective forces. We have spoken of this before as it affected Ney. It was the same with the movement prescribed to Grouchy,—“Take your right wing to Sombreffe,”—[305] _i.e._, the two _corps-d’armée_, and the three cavalry corps. Whatever Napoleon may have conjectured as to the force or intentions of the enemy, both of his movements this forenoon,—that of the main army on Sombreffe, and that of the left wing on Quatre Bras,—were to be made in force,—with all the force he could muster. If he did expect, as some writers think, that his enemies would retire before him, he at any rate made every preparation to fight and overcome them, should they give him battle. It was in order, as we have pointed out, that these movements might be made simultaneously, and in sufficient force, that they were deferred to such a late period in the day,—the backwardness of the 1st Corps having postponed for several hours the concentration of the left wing. It will be noticed that in none of these letters or formal orders is the 6th Corps under the Count of Lobau mentioned. The inference is, that, at that time, the Emperor desired to retain this body of troops as a reserve for the whole army. He wanted to get along, if he could, without employing it at all in the present stage of the campaign. FOOTNOTES: [290] Doc. Inéd., Heymès, p. 6. [291] _Cf._ La Tour D’Auvergne, pp. 91, 92. [292] Doc. Inéd., X, p. 32; App. C, xviii; _post_, pp. 377, 378. [293] _Ante_, p. 121, note 23. [294] _Ante_, p. 121, note 21. [295] Doc. Inéd., XXI, p. 63; App. C, xxiii; _post_, p. 382. [296] Ib., XI, pp. 37, 38; App. C, xix; _post_, p. 379. [297] _Ante_, pp. 5, 13, 14. [298] Ollech, p. 123. [299] Corresp., vol. 28, p. 334. Doc. Inéd., X, p. 32; App. C, xviii; _post_, pp. 377, 378. [300] Flahaut, says Reille, passed through Gosselies about 10 A.M. Doc. Inéd., XI, pp. 37, 38; App. C, xix; _post_, p. 379. [301] This seems to imply that the Emperor did not propose to carry the Guard to Gembloux. [302] See _ante_, p. 123. [303] Corresp., vol. 28, p. 336; App. C, xxiv; _post_, pp. 382, 383. [304] Ollech, pp. 112, 113: D’Auvergne, pp. 103, 104: Charras, vol. 1, pp. 143, 144. [305] “_Rendez-vous avec cette aile droite à Sombreffe._” _NOTES TO CHAPTER IX._