And he directs Ney to be all ready to march to Brussels, as soon as he (Napoleon) shall have arrived at a decision. But this decision, it is to be observed, was not to be taken until the Prussians should either have been attacked and defeated, or should have fallen back at least as far as Gembloux. To the same effect is the letter to Grouchy:[314] “If the enemy is at Sombreffe I am going to attack him; I am going to attack him even at Gembloux, and to carry even that position; my intention being, after having explored (_connu_) these two positions, to set out this night and to operate with my left wing, which is under the command of Marshal Ney, against the English.” It is plain from both these letters that to say that Napoleon was “divided in his mind” between “pressing on direct to Brussels between the two allied armies” and attacking the Prussians in front of him,—in other words, that he was hesitating which of these two courses he would take, is a statement utterly without foundation. In both despatches he states unequivocally his immediate intention,—namely, to attack the Prussians; and it was only after he should have attacked and driven the Prussians and forced them as far to the eastward as Gembloux, that he proposed to retrace his steps, to reinforce Ney, and march against the English. Brussels, indeed, was regarded by Napoleon as perhaps the most important result of the campaign, next to the enormous military advantage which would be secured by the defeat or dispersion of the armies of Wellington and Blücher. But this was all. For the Emperor to gain Brussels, these hostile armies must either be attacked and beaten, or else they must definitely separate, each retiring towards its own base. The idea of passing between the two armies at this stage of the campaign, and so arriving at Brussels, it is safe to say, never entered Napoleon’s mind. His object, as Jomini[315] correctly states, was “not to occupy Brussels, but to destroy the opposing masses in succession.” FOOTNOTES: [306] It is, however, given in Du Casse’s Vandamme, vol. 2, p. 562. [307] Jomini, pp. 129, 130. [308] Charras, vol. 1, pp. 138, 145, 182. [309] Siborne, vol. 1, p. 85. [310] The Duke of Wellington, however, thought the inactivity of Napoleon on the morning of the 16th was necessitated by the long marches of the past few days. Ellesmere, pp. 296, 297. So, Clausewitz, ch. 25, p. 53. [311] _Ante_, pp. 132, 139. [312] Chesney, pp. 138, 139: See also, Clinton, p. 380. [313] Corresp., vol. 28, p. 334: Doc. Inéd., X, p. 32; App. C, xviii; _post_, pp. 377, 378. [314] Corresp., vol. 28, p. 336; App. C, xxiv; _post_, pp. 382, 383. [315] Jomini, p. 112. CHAPTER X. THE BATTLE OF LIGNY. BLÜCHER’S DECISION TO ACCEPT BATTLE NOT DEPENDENT ON WELLINGTON’S ASSURANCE OF SUPPORT.