We must say that such a contention seems to us hardly to deserve serious consideration. It is surely plain enough that Blücher had chosen a battle-field,—had posted his army there,—had encouraged his troops to expect a conflict with the French,—without taking counsel with the English general.[331] Had he determined to fight only if he should receive assurance of support from Wellington, would he not have taken some pains to obtain such assurance? Would he have left it entirely to the chance of Wellington’s writing him a letter, or riding over to his headquarters? These questions answer themselves. We conclude, then, that it is a fact beyond controversy that Marshal Blücher decided to accept battle at Ligny altogether independently of any support or assistance that might be afforded him by the Anglo-Dutch army. He deliberately ran the risk of encountering, unsupported by his allies, and with such only of his troops as he could on short notice collect close to the frontier, the bulk of the French army under Napoleon himself. How far he was wise in this we will consider in another place; what we have sought to make plain now is that such was the fact. FOOTNOTES: [316] _Ante_, p. 70. [317] Ollech, p. 120. [318] Pirch II. commanded a brigade in the 1st Corps. [319] Ollech, p. 122. [320] Gneisenau, vol. 4, p. 373. [321] Ollech, p. 125. [322] Müffling: Passages, 230, 231, 237. [323] Charras, vol. 1, pp. 150, 151, and note. Damitz, p. 92. Gneisenau, vol. 4, p. 375. Charras states in the note cited above that Clausewitz “says that it was the promise of help from Wellington that decided Blücher to receive battle,”—but we have not been able to find the passage. He also says that Siborne substantially follows Damitz in this matter; but we can not find that Siborne represents Wellington as making any such promise. In his official report of the battle Blücher does not claim that such a promise was given. Jones, pp. 320, 321. [324] Müffling: Passages, pp. 233-237. [325] Ollech, p. 127, note. [326] Ib., p. 127. [327] Ollech (p. 142) quotes Gneisenau as writing on the 17th: “We received from the Duke of Wellington the written promise that if the enemy should attack us, he would attack them in the rear.” There is no such promise in Wellington’s letter to Blücher. [328] La Tour D’Auvergne, p. 109, entirely disbelieves this assertion. [329] Gneisenau, p. 372. [330] Müffling: Passages, p. 234. [331] Blücher’s Report leaves the question open. Jones, pp. 320, 321. _NOTE TO CHAPTER X._