All parts of the French army on the field had taken part in this action except the 1st and 6th Corps. The 1st Corps retired towards Frasnes soon after it had been seen. As for the 6th Corps, the order to Lobau, which was not sent until 2.30 P.M., could not have reached him in his bivouac near Charleroi till 3.30 P.M. He had eight miles to march before reaching Fleurus; he was then directed on Ligny, and he passed through Ligny, just after the successful attack of that place by the Imperial Guard, to his final position on the plateau of Bussy, between Brye and Sombreffe, where he arrived about 9.30 P.M.[368] It has been considered singular, that when Lobau arrived at Fleurus, say, about 7.30 P.M.,[369] he should have been directed on Ligny, apparently to support the movement of the Guard; whereas if he had been instructed to move on Brye by passing around St. Amand and Wagnelée it would seem that he might have struck the defeated Prussians in flank and rear, and accomplished substantially what Napoleon expected from Ney. But the withdrawal of the 1st Corps could only be explained by the supposition that Ney had encountered the English in considerable force; and under these circumstances Napoleon may have deemed it wiser to retain the 6th Corps as a reserve for the whole army.[370] The battle of Ligny was a great victory, although it was not a decisive victory. Napoleon had diminished by one-third the strength of his opponent’s army, and had also driven him from the field. He had certainly achieved a great success. But the advantage obtained was not all that he had a right to expect. Had it not been for the appearance of d’Erlon’s Corps in the neighborhood of St. Amand, the attack by the Guard would have been made at half-past five o’clock, when there would have been sufficient daylight left to have made it possible to follow up the victory. On such a result as would have been obtained in this event Napoleon had a right to calculate, and that he did not obtain such a result was in no way his fault.[371] For the purpose therefore, of estimating the adequacy of the Emperor’s measures to the task before him, and the danger which Marshal Blücher ran when he accepted battle, we should consider what would have been the result, if the attack of the Guard had been made two hours earlier than it was made, and there had been two hours of daylight in which to complete the defeat and to pursue the enemy. As for the coöperation of Ney, that is a different matter. Napoleon could not know what resistance Ney might encounter; hence he could not calculate on his overcoming that resistance and sending a reinforcement to the main army,—he could only hope that Ney would be able to do this. If Ney should be able to keep off the English, all that Napoleon had a right to calculate on would be effected. Whether Ney could have accomplished more than he did accomplish will be considered in another place.