[355] The Duke of Elchingen—Doc. Inéd., p. 41—estimates the distance at nearly five leagues, that is, 12-1/2 miles, and allows two hours for the time occupied. Charras, vol. 1, page 204, n., makes the distance six leagues (15 miles) and estimates the time at three hours. [356] Charras, vol. 1, p. 166. [357] Ib., p. 164. [358] Sometimes classed as part of the Old Guard, as in Charras, vol. 1, p. 67 and La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 48, and sometimes as “the Middle Guard” (_la Garde moyenne_). See “Napoléon à Waterloo,” p, 315, n. 1; p. 325. [359] We shall consider in another place how d’Erlon’s Corps came to be there. Shortly after it was seen by Vandamme it retired to Frasnes. [360] La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 135: Jomini, pp. 138, 139. [361] There was no delay, as suggested by Siborne, vol. 1, p. 218. From where the Guard had been stationed to the northerly end of the village of Ligny, where it was put in, was at least two miles and a half. Only a small part of this distance had been traversed before the news from Vandamme caused a halt. [362] Charras, vol. 1, p. 175, n. 2: letter from Soult to Joseph Bonaparte. [363] Charras, vol. 1, p. 179, where he discusses the Prussian authorities. _Cf._ Muquardt, p. 139, n. [364] _Cf._ Gneisenau, vol. 4, pp. 381, 382. Müffling: Passages, pp. 204, 205, 223. Siborne, vol. 1, pp. 302, 303. [365] Charras, vol. 1, p. 180. [366] Ib., pp. 177, 178. [367] Ib., p. 179. [368] Charras, vol. 1, p. 178. [369] Charras (vol. 1, p. 184) thinks it was not later than 6.30 P.M. when the 6th Corps reached Fleurus. [370] Charras (vol. 1, pp. 184, 185) severely criticises this decision. [371] Unless he erred in arresting the attack of the Guard on the appearance of the strange corps. See _post_, p. 174, note 8. _NOTES TO CHAPTER XI._ 1. Napoleon has been often blamed because he did not begin the battle of Ligny till between two and three o’clock in the afternoon. We have spoken of this criticism before, and recur to it now merely to repeat that the greater part of this delay may (in all probability) be accounted for by his wish that his own advance-movement should be contemporaneous with that of the left wing, one-half of which was far in the rear. There was probably also an unusual amount of time spent in examining the position of the enemy. Clausewitz[372] is undoubtedly right in saying that “If the actual tactical shock of battle could have been arranged to take place in the morning of the 16th, it would have been an enormous mistake in Napoleon to have delayed it, for Blücher was collecting his troops at that time, and, as the whole force of the Prussians [including Bülow’s Corps, which for anything Napoleon knew to the contrary, might arrive during the day] was far superior to the 75,000 men which he could use against it, nothing was so important as to offer battle before it was all got together.”