In other words, Napoleon defends his plan of battle by showing that it aimed at a decisive tactical success; that its accomplishment would practically have destroyed half of the Prussian army; which an attack upon the exposed right wing would not have effected. He contends that the Prussians being, as they certainly were, on this day, completely separated from the English, the best thing he could possibly do was to take advantage of their faulty formation, and cut off and destroy the two exposed corps. This he calculated he could effect with the troops he had in hand. Then he undoubtedly hoped that he would get assistance from Ney in this operation.[378] The order to Ney at 2 P.M. shows this beyond a question; and this order was reiterated at a quarter-past three. Napoleon said to Gérard during the battle,[379] “It is possible that in three hours the issue of the war may be decided. If Ney executes his orders well, not a cannon in the Prussian army can escape capture. That army is taken _en flagrant délit_.” This last expression occurs also in the 3.15 P.M. order. The possibility of Ney’s sending a force down the Quatre-Bras-Namur turnpike to take the exposed Prussian right wing in rear, was therefore an additional reason for inclining him to make his main attack at Ligny, and thereby isolate this wing, with the hope of surrounding and destroying it. That he had no right to count on Ney’s coöperation is certainly true, as has been stated above; but then Napoleon believed that he could carry out his plan without Ney’s coöperation, and that if Ney should assist him, his success would be overwhelming. To the reasons advanced by Rogniat for making the main attack upon the right flank of the Prussians, Marshal Davout adds another:—[380] “He ought not to have left the Prussian army between himself and Marshal Ney; because, in that case, if he should beat the Prussians, he would force them to retire in the direction of the English.” To the same effect Clausewitz[381] asks, “whether Bonaparte ought to have arranged his attack so as to drive Blücher towards Wellington, or so as to push him away from him,”—implying that the result of the battle as fought by Napoleon had the former effect. “If,” says Clausewitz, “Bonaparte had attacked St. Amand with his right wing, Wagnelée with his left, and had advanced with a third column against the road from Brussels,[382] the Prussians, if they lost the battle, would have been forced to retreat along the Roman road, that is, towards the Meuse, and a union with Wellington in the days immediately following the battle would have been very uncertain, perhaps impossible.”