As to Ney’s whereabouts at the time when the 2 P.M. order should reach him, say, at 5 P.M., we have spoken before,[385] and have shown that, long before that hour, certainly as early as 4 P.M., the whole of the 2d Corps and the greater part of the 1st Corps ought to have arrived at Quatre Bras. In fact, it will be remembered that had Reille obeyed at once Ney’s order to him he would have arrived at Quatre Bras at noon; and there was nothing to prevent d’Erlon following promptly on his traces. Napoleon, it is true, as we learn from his own narrative, had heard of this vexatious delay, caused by Reille,—which he naturally but erroneously attributed to Reille’s superior, Ney,—but he still seemed to think it possible that Ney could be at Quatre Bras at noon, notwithstanding. This, to be sure, was absolutely out of Ney’s power, as we have seen; but there was no reason whatever why Ney should not have had long before 5 P.M. his whole command well in hand, at or in front of Quatre Bras. Napoleon was perfectly justified in assuming this to be the case. But though Ney might well be at Quatre Bras with his whole force, he might yet be entirely unable to comply with the Emperor’s order to detach a force to attack the Prussians in rear. Clausewitz[386] points out that Ney with his 40,000 men could easily encounter 50,000 to 60,000 English and Dutch. This is certainly true. It may be added that the last dispatch[387] sent to Ney informed him that an officer of lancers had just informed the Emperor that large masses of the enemy were to be seen near Quatre Bras. This information was incorrect, as a matter of fact, yet it was believed to be true at the time the despatch was written. Of course the truth may have been ascertained before the 2 P.M. order was sent to Ney; but we do not know this for a fact. There was certainly no reason why Napoleon should have felt certain that Ney would find it possible to send troops to his assistance; it all depended upon the forwardness of the concentration of the Duke of Wellington’s army; and as to this Napoleon could but guess,—he had no information at all. 5. If Napoleon, then, could not rely with any certainty on Ney’s assistance, was he justified in adopting a plan of battle, to the full success of which Ney’s coöperation was essential? Would it not have been wiser for him to have adopted the plan recommended by Rogniat, Davout and Clausewitz, and to have thrown his whole force on the exposed right wing of the Prussians?