The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History: Third EditionRopes, John Codman
History
The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History: Third Edition
Ropes, John Codman
Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769-1821 -- Elba and the Hundred Days, 1814-1815; Waterloo, Battle of, Waterloo, Belgium, 1815
What actually happened was this. Durutte, who commanded the leading
division of the 1st Corps, when in march from Jumet for Frasnes,[406]
received orders from Ney to continue his march to Quatre Bras. But, as
he was reaching Frasnes,[407] he was ordered by one of the Emperor’s
aides, on his own responsibility,[408] to direct his march towards
Brye. This order Durutte obeyed, and, on arriving at Frasnes, turned
the head of the column to the right. D’Erlon, who, had he been present,
might have stopped this unauthorized proceeding, had unfortunately
ridden in advance of his corps. The aide, who, according to d’Erlon’s
statement, was carrying a pencil note to Marshal Ney, came up with
d’Erlon just beyond Frasnes, and told him what he had done. D’Erlon
then rode back to join his command, sending his chief-of-staff to
Marshal Ney to inform him what had happened. The 1st Corps then
proceeded by way of Villers-Peruin towards St. Amand for possibly
a couple of miles,[409] when it was seen by Vandamme, who between
5.30 and 6 o’clock reported to the Emperor the appearance of this
unexpected body of troops.[410] The corps must have been seen,
therefore, shortly after 5 o’clock. It must, therefore, have left the
Charleroi road at Frasnes somewhere about 4.30 P.M. That is, the head
of d’Erlon’s column did not reach Frasnes till two hours and a half
after the rear of the 2d Corps had left it. For, as we have seen, the
last division of the 2d Corps, Jerome’s, had passed through Frasnes by
2 o’clock.
This fact, that there was a march of two hours and a half between
the two corps which constituted the principal part of Marshal Ney’s
command, has not received due attention.[411] It is impossible to
account for it without laying a grave responsibility on the shoulders
of both Marshal Ney and the Comte d’Erlon. There is no need of dwelling
on the importance of the matter. That there was no sufficient effort
to obey the orders of the Emperor,—vigorously and energetically to
carry out the duty assigned to this wing of the army,—is too plain for
argument. It needs hardly to be remarked, that if Durutte had followed
closely on the traces of Jerome,—even if he had started from Jumet at
the moment when Jerome started from Gosselies, and had not (as would
have been natural and proper) moved up nearer to Gosselies before the
order to march to Quatre Bras arrived,—he could not have been turned
off the main road by the Emperor’s staff-officer, for, long before
half-past four o’clock, which was the hour when the staff-officer
reached Frasnes, Durutte would have been fighting the English at Quatre
Bras. One cannot avoid the conclusion that Marshal Ney’s measures for
getting his command together on the field of battle this day were
singularly ineffective.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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