The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History: Third EditionRopes, John Codman
History
The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History: Third Edition
Ropes, John Codman
Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769-1821 -- Elba and the Hundred Days, 1814-1815; Waterloo, Battle of, Waterloo, Belgium, 1815
Baudus’ book was published twenty-six years after the battle. His
recollection of the fact that he was sent on such a mission was no
doubt clear; very likely he remembered with approximate accuracy what
Napoleon and Soult said to him; but he may easily have been mistaken
as to the order itself. It would be very natural that an order to Ney
directing him to send the 1st Corps to attack the Prussian right might
be mistaken for an order to d’Erlon, who commanded the 1st Corps,
to do this. And what to our mind settles the matter is, that if the
order had really been one directed to d’Erlon, neither the Emperor nor
Soult would have wasted their time in asking Baudus to ask Ney not to
interfere with its execution. If, on the other hand, it was an order
to Ney, urging on him to detach a part of his command to take the
Prussians in rear, such remarks as Napoleon and Soult made to Baudus
were directly apposite, and were made, no doubt, in order that they
might be repeated to Ney, so that he might enter more fully into the
Emperor’s view of the situation. Lastly, although no specific mention
might be made in the written order of the troops which Ney was to
detach, it is extremely probable that both Napoleon and Soult spoke
of the 1st Corps in this connection, as it was of course known that
d’Erlon was to come up in rear of Reille, who might very probably be
actively engaged, and that d’Erlon’s Corps, therefore, would probably
be sent, if any was sent.
We have little doubt that Baudus carried the duplicate of the 3.15
P.M. order to Marshal Ney. Everything that he says about it points to
this; the statement that the battle was at its height when the order
was given to him would be true at a quarter-past three; the strong
language of the Emperor and Soult as to the importance of persuading
Ney to comply with their request has the same ring as the language of
the order.[440] Baudus tells us that when he was nearing Quatre Bras
he was nearly run down by Kellermann’s cuirassiers, who were, as we
have seen,[441] routed between 6 and 7 P.M.[442] Charras says that the
3.15 P.M. order[443] arrived at 6 o’clock.[444] This duplicate of it,
dated 3.30 P.M.[445] the transmission of which was delayed, as we have
seen, by the verbal messages to Ney, may very possibly not have reached
the Marshal till half-past six. Baudus found Ney in a state of great
exasperation against the Emperor, who had, as he had been told, ordered
the 1st Corps to march upon St. Amand without informing him of this
change of plan. The fact that Baudus saw nothing of the 1st Corps on
the road confirms our hypothesis that that corps had been turned off by
the bearer of the 2 P.M. despatch.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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