The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History: Third EditionRopes, John Codman
History
The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History: Third Edition
Ropes, John Codman
Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769-1821 -- Elba and the Hundred Days, 1814-1815; Waterloo, Battle of, Waterloo, Belgium, 1815
There is in the letter no trace of that certainty as to the position
of affairs so plainly exhibited in the verbal orders. The news that a
Prussian corps has been seen at Gembloux has evidently made a strong
impression on the Emperor. It may very possibly indicate that Blücher
is not falling back to Namur. The statement is twice made in the
letter that the Emperor is in doubt as to the intentions of the
Prussians, and the chief task now imposed upon Grouchy is to ascertain
those intentions. _The precise danger to be anticipated is stated
explicitly._ Grouchy is warned in so many words that the Prussians
may be intending to unite with the English to try the fate of another
battle for the defence of Brussels,—which was exactly what they were
intending to do, and what they succeeded in doing. Whether they are
or are not intending to do this, is the principal thing for Grouchy
to find out. As the Emperor had previously informed Grouchy of his
determination to fight the English “if they will stand on this side
of the Forest of Soignes,”—which meant of course that he looked upon
a battle with them the next day as very possible,—this question of
the Prussians uniting with the English in fighting this battle was of
vital importance to him.[479] _What Grouchy was to do if he found the
Prussians directing their movements so as to compass this end, it was
left to him to determine for himself._ It might be that he could hinder
the accomplishment of their design most effectually by attacking them;
it might be that his best course would be to rejoin the main army as
soon as he could, or to manœuvre so as to act in conjunction with it.
It was impossible for Napoleon to tell beforehand how things would turn
out. Full discretion was therefore left to Grouchy to take whatever
course might seem best to him.
Marshal Grouchy was making his arrangements to get his command under
way when he received this letter. He experienced great delay in
beginning his march to Gembloux. Vandamme did not get started till two
o’clock. Gérard left Ligny an hour later. It came on to rain hard about
two o’clock, and the roads soon became very bad. Grouchy did not
succeed in getting farther with his two infantry corps that night than
Gembloux, which is rather less than eight miles from St. Amand.[480]
The cavalry of Exelmans was, however, stationed at Sauvenières, to
gather information. Grouchy had with him a force of 33,319 men of
all arms, of whom 4,446 were the cavalry belonging to the two corps
of Pajol and Exelmans.[481] Napoleon took with himself Domon’s light
cavalry division of the 3d Corps, but Grouchy retained that of Maurin,
belonging to the 4th Corps,—say, 1,500 men. That is, he had 6,000
cavalry in all.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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