The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History: Third EditionRopes, John Codman
History
The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History: Third Edition
Ropes, John Codman
Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769-1821 -- Elba and the Hundred Days, 1814-1815; Waterloo, Battle of, Waterloo, Belgium, 1815
Leaving Marshal Grouchy at Gembloux with the right wing, we now return
to Napoleon, who, when we left him, was about to lead the reserves,
consisting of the 6th Corps and the Guard, and some cavalry, to Quatre
Bras. Orders, repeated orders, had been sent, as we have seen, to
Marshal Ney, to get him to move upon Quatre Bras. But Ney had not
moved a man.[484] Charras thinks he must have informed the Emperor, in
obedience to the 8 A.M. order, that the English were still in force
in his front. But there is no evidence whatever of this. Charras
himself,[485] after censuring the Emperor for his delays on this
morning, does not assign as the cause of the second and more peremptory
despatch to Ney, dated at noon, any reply of Ney’s to the 8 A.M.
despatch, but the return of a reconnoitring party sent out by Napoleon
himself, which reported the English at Quatre Bras. If anything
further were needed to show that Ney vouchsafed no reply to the 8
A.M. despatch, it is found in the fact that this noon order refers to
no such reply. In fact it was not until Ney saw the column under the
Emperor in person advancing on the Namur road that he put his cavalry
in motion, and it was the Emperor’s own staff officers[486] that
ordered d’Erlon forward in pursuit of the English. This was about 1 P.M.
Wellington had collected at Quatre Bras about 45,000 men. The rest
of his army was at Nivelles and Braine-le-Comte. Since 10 A.M. he
had been quietly withdrawing his forces, and Ney had not offered an
interruption.[487] Probably he did not know what Wellington was doing.
Yet Ney must have had at his disposal about 40,000 men, 25,000 of whom
had not fired a shot or drawn a sword. There is no saying what loss the
English might not have been obliged to suffer, if he had vigorously
pressed them. His conduct on this day is even more culpable than on the
day before. There was not only not any of that intelligent coöperation
which, as has been remarked, Napoleon always counted upon in his
lieutenants,—there was positive disobedience of orders.
At Quatre Bras, the Emperor, who had ridden from Ligny in his carriage,
mounted his horse,[488] and led the pursuit in person. He now saw, and
no doubt with mortification, what an opportunity he had missed. He
was also, and with reason, indignant[489] with Ney for not having
obeyed his orders, ascertained that Wellington was withdrawing his
forces, sent him word at once, and energetically pressed the enemy.
His fatigue seems to have wholly disappeared, and he showed, this
afternoon of the 17th as he had on the afternoon of the 15th,[490] how
he could infuse his own activity and energy into his troops. We have
two pictures of Napoleon on this afternoon, by eye witnesses. The Count
d’Erlon, in his autobiography,[491] says:—
“The Emperor found me in advance of this position (Quatre Bras), and
said to me in a tone of profound chagrin these words, which have been
always graven on my memory:—
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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