For it was a perfectly possible thing that he might the next morning be assailed by a hundred thousand men. Blücher had, no doubt, sent him the information obtained by Groeben, that Napoleon had detached only 12,000 or 15,000 men to follow the Prussians, and was bringing against the Anglo-Dutch army all his remaining troops.[544] As we see it now, that would have been Napoleon’s best course. If he had known the facts at the time, as he might easily have done had he not neglected to take the proper measures to ascertain them, that is what he probably would have done. At any rate, Wellington had no assurance from any quarter whatever that Napoleon would not do exactly that thing. If Napoleon had done it, and if the weather had been fine and the ground hard, what chance would Wellington have stood? The question is asked simply to define the situation in which the Duke placed himself on the night of the 17th and 18th. That is, we desire to bring out the fact that Wellington in taking up position at Waterloo, instead of continuing his retreat to Brussels and arranging with Blücher to do the like from Wavre, ran a very great risk of being beaten before he could get help from the Prussians, whereas if both commanders had proceeded to Brussels, where the roads from Waterloo and Wavre converge, they would have greatly outnumbered the French. This course was the one which Napoleon maintained would have been the safer and wiser.[545] Still, it must be remembered that both Wellington and Blücher were anxious to close the campaign with a great battle, which was certain to take place if Wellington stood at Waterloo, and that it was by no means certain that Napoleon would push through the forest of Soignes only to find the combined armies confronting him. They also thought that there was a very fair chance that they would succeed in effecting the union of their armies at Waterloo. FOOTNOTES: [513] _Ante_, p. 159. [514] Ollech, p. 157. [515] He could not at this time communicate with Thielemann and Bülow. [516] Gneisenau, vol. 4, p. 385; Ollech, p. 156. [517] Ollech, p. 157. Maurice (pp. 354, 355: July, 1890) points out that this serves, as far as it goes, to show that Napoleon might have known of the retreat of Zieten and Pirch I. to Wavre without changing his opinion that the whole Prussian army was intending to fall back to the eastward. [518] Damitz, p. 143. [519] This is Ollech’s opinion (p. 156): “Thus had Gneisenau broken all bridges behind him, given up all communication with the Rhine, that he might once again offer the hand to the English for a common blow which should forever overthrow the French forces.” But this is surely going too far. Communication with the Rhine could be maintained as well by way of Maestricht as by way of Liége. [520] _Ante_, pp. 151, 204. _Cf._ Gneisenau, vol. 4, p. 386 [521] Gneisenau, vol. 4, p. 386. [522] Ollech, p. 156; Gneisenau, vol. 4, p. 385. [523] Müffling: Passages, p. 212. [524] _Ante_, p. 106.