“One may ask,—What ought the English general to have done after the battle of Ligny and the combat of Quatre Bras? There cannot be two opinions on this subject. He ought on the night of the 17th and 18th to have traversed the Forest of Soignes by the Charleroi pike, while the Prussian army was traversing it by the Wavre pike; the two armies could then unite at daybreak before Brussels, leaving rearguards to defend the forest,—gain some days to give those of the Prussians who had been dispersed by the battle of Ligny time to rejoin the army,—obtain reinforcements from the fourteen English regiments which were either in garrison in Belgium or had just landed at Ostend on their return from America,—and leave the Emperor of the French to manœuvre as he liked. Would he, with an army of 100,000 men, have traversed the forest of Soignes to attack on the other side of it the two hostile armies united, more than 200,000 strong, and in position? That would certainly have been the most advantageous thing that could happen to the allies. Would he have been contented to take up a position himself? He certainly could not have kept it long, for 300,000 Russians, Austrians, and Bavarians, already arrived at the Rhine, would in a few weeks have been on the Marne, which would have obliged him to fly to the defence of the capital. Then, the Anglo-Prussian army could have marched forward, and joined their allies under the walls of Paris.” It is plain that the course pointed out by the Emperor would have avoided all the risks incurred by Wellington in giving battle at Waterloo, with the needed support not available until afternoon. But Clausewitz[560] denies that Wellington incurred any risk. “Wavre is distant from Wellington’s field of battle about two [German, or about ten English] miles. From the moment when the Duke of Wellington saw the enemy appear in his front up to Blücher’s arrival, six or eight hours would therefore have to elapse, unless Blücher had started still earlier; but in that time a battle against 70,000 men cannot be begun, fought and decided; it was therefore not to be feared that Wellington would be defeated before Blücher arrived.”