The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History: Third EditionRopes, John Codman
History
The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History: Third Edition
Ropes, John Codman
Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769-1821 -- Elba and the Hundred Days, 1814-1815; Waterloo, Battle of, Waterloo, Belgium, 1815
It is also perfectly plain that no opposition to Marshal Grouchy’s
occupation of Wavre was apprehended. It is therefore fairly to be
inferred that the writer intended, that, if the situation should be
such from any cause that the occupation of Wavre or the attempt to
occupy it, would not subserve the purpose of enabling Grouchy to draw
nearer to the main army, he should carry out this purpose in some
other way. It seems to us foolish to say that this despatch would have
justified Grouchy in taking the course which he did take, supposing,
that is, that he had received it in time for it to affect his action.
If, for example, a gentleman on a walking tour should order his servant
to bring his baggage to a certain town, so that he might easily get at
it from the place where he was himself expecting to be the next day,
and the servant should find that all communication between this town
and the region where his master expected to be had been interrupted by
some accident, like the destruction of a railway-bridge, for instance,
and he should nevertheless bring his master’s baggage to that town,
instead of bringing it within his master’s reach by carrying it to
some other place, justifying himself by the terms of the letter, he
would generally be regarded as having acted like a fool. Yet this is
very nearly a parallel case to that of Marshal Grouchy, supposing that
he had received the despatch in time to have acted on it, and had then
acted as he did. The only thing needed to make it absolutely parallel
is, that the servant in the case supposed should be in possession of
information, of which his master was ignorant, making the carrying of
the baggage to him at the earliest possible moment a matter of the
utmost importance. Then the cases would be on all fours with each other.
But we have delayed perhaps too long to show that this order cannot
justify Grouchy’s action. Our excuse is that it has been so used by
more than one authority.[624] Nor does the order show that Napoleon
would have made the same mistake that Grouchy did, as has sometimes
been thoughtlessly said; for Napoleon, at the time the despatch
was sent off, knew nothing, as has just been pointed out, of the
circumstances then under Grouchy’s observation.
It cannot, of course, be contended that Napoleon was not responsible
for this order of 10 A.M. A commander-in-chief must be supposed to
know what orders are issued in his name. Yet it is certainly true that
the directions given to Marbot do not tally at all with this order to
Grouchy. According to the latter, Grouchy would be looked for in the
direction of Wavre,—that is, of Lasne and St. Lambert; but Marbot was
given to understand that the Emperor expected Grouchy to cross the Dyle
at the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies. Colonel Marbot, in a letter
written to Marshal Grouchy in 1830, says:—[625]
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