If the Prussians were going to separate themselves from the English, there was no great risk in making such a large detachment from the main army, and there might very possibly be occasions in which a force of 33,000 men might accomplish more than a smaller one. It may, however, well be questioned whether half the number would not have answered every end, and allowed the Emperor the use of 15,000 more men in his contest with Wellington, who certainly could have brought to the encounter 18,000 more men than he actually had on the field. On the other hand, if the Prussians were intending to unite with the English, as Napoleon had some reason at any rate to believe, and if Grouchy did not rejoin the main army, or at least act in connection with it, or defeat the Prussians while marching to the field of battle, Napoleon was ruined. There was then the risk of his not doing either of these things,—whether through the Prussians having so many hours the start of him,—or through ignorance of the facts,—bad roads,—broken bridges,—unsound judgment,—it matters not,—and that risk was assumed by Napoleon when he detached him, without, as it seems to us, any compensating advantage. Our conclusion, then, is this: if Napoleon had sent off Grouchy with his 33,000 men in the full belief that the Prussians had fallen back on Namur, he would be chargeable only with neglect in not having found out where they had gone; but his sending off this large force after he had so much reason to apprehend that the Prussians were intending to unite with the English that he expressly warned Grouchy to that effect, was to take a wholly unnecessary and very dangerous risk. It was to persist in carrying out a plan which new information had rendered entirely inapplicable to the circumstances as now understood to exist.