But General Hamley[644] is of a different opinion. He approves of Grouchy’s direct movement on Wavre. After remarking that Grouchy did not know that Wellington would stop to fight at Waterloo, he says:— “He thought the Prussians, if they were really moving on Wavre, intended to join Wellington at Brussels. * * * And were they so moving, he, by marching to Wavre, would threaten decisively their communications with their base by Louvain, and so either prevent the execution of their project, or render it disastrous.” It is unnecessary to say anything in regard to this observation, except that, if Grouchy thought as Hamley thinks he did,—and as he very likely did,—he was wholly mistaken as to the intention of Marshal Blücher. Very possibly he might have injured the Prussians a good deal had they been intending to go to Brussels; but, as they were, on the contrary, intending to join Wellington, who had taken up a position for battle to the south of the Forest of Soignes, Grouchy’s calculations, as given us by Hamley, were beside the mark, and his movements were entirely useless. It is certainly true, as Hamley says,[645] that Grouchy did not know that “Wellington would stop to fight at Waterloo.” But Grouchy expressly says that Napoleon told him[646] that he was going “to march upon the English, and fight them, if they stood this side [_i.e._, south of] the Forest of Soignes,” _i.e._, at Waterloo. This indicated that Napoleon thought it quite possible that the English might take their stand there and fight. And the Bertrand order warned Grouchy that the Prussians might be intending to unite with them to fight a battle for the defence of Brussels. But this order, as we have observed before, is utterly ignored by General Hamley. 5. We have pointed out in the text that the three principal Continental critics,—Jomini, Clausewitz and Charras,—unite in the opinion that Marshal Grouchy should have marched at daybreak for the bridge of Moustier,—covering the movement by his cavalry. What would have been the result of this manœuvre? (See Map 9.) Let us suppose that the Prussian detachment of Ledebur, which was stationed at Mont St. Guibert to observe the movements of Marshal Grouchy’s column, had been driven out of their position, or flanked out of it (as they finally were), before six in the morning, by the French cavalry, and had been compelled to retire to the neighborhood of Wavre. The movements of the main body of Grouchy’s command might, therefore, without much difficulty, have been concealed from observation. At least this seems to be assumed by Jomini,[647] who says that Grouchy could have been at the bridge of Moustier at 10 A.M.,—and then have moved “on Wavre by Limale, pushing Exelmans’ dragoons on St. Lambert, or else have marched to Lasne himself.”