“La Haye Sainte was in the hands of the enemy; also the knoll on the opposite side of the road; also the garden and ground on the Anglo-Allied side of it; Ompteda’s brigade was nearly annihilated, and Kielmansegge’s so thinned, that those two brigades could not hold their position. That part of the field of battle, therefore, which was between Halkett’s[720] left and Kempt’s[721] right, was unprotected; and being the very centre of the Duke’s line of battle, was consequently that point, above all others, which the enemy wished to gain. The danger was imminent; and at no other period of the action was the result so precarious as at this moment. Most fortunately Napoleon did not support the advantage his troops had gained at this point by bringing forward his reserve; proving that he did not exert that activity and personal energy in superintending and conforming to the progress of the action, which he ought to have done.” As to this last observation, we have just seen how the Emperor was employed during this critical period of the action. He was in truth fighting another battle with inferior forces against the Prussians, and this, too, at a distance of a mile and a half from the English line of battle.[722] The criticism on Napoleon is therefore unfounded; it is due simply to the fact that his occupation during this period of the battle was not borne in mind by General Shaw-Kennedy. But the fact remains; if there had been no other battle to fight,—no desperate action at Planchenoit, requiring the presence and personal direction of the Emperor,—if the attack upon the allied lines could have been made under the eye and direct orders of Napoleon himself,—in the opinion of Kennedy, whose account of the battle is one of the best we have, it would have gone hard with Wellington’s army. Add to this, that if there had been no other battle to fight, the Emperor could have brought 16,000 fresh men to bear upon this exhausted force of Wellington’s. It should be added, also, that the English heavy cavalry of Somerset and Ponsonby, which had been well nigh exhausted by their charges at the beginning of the action, and had suffered more or less during the afternoon, were not able to render efficient service at the close of the day.