16. It is maintained that Marshal Grouchy, if he had started for the bridge of Moustier at daybreak,[800] or had followed the advice of Gérard at noon,[801] would probably have stopped Bülow and Pirch I. by engaging them, and that Zieten, in all probability, would not have proceeded further than Ohain;[802] in which case Napoleon would have been able to employ his whole army against that of Wellington, and would have defeated it. Coming now to the Allies:— 17. It is contended that the definite understanding as to the steps to be taken in the event of a French invasion, which has generally been attributed to the Duke of Wellington and Marshal Blücher, did not exist.[803] 18. That the Duke, in the early morning hours of the 16th, ordered a general concentration of his army at Quatre Bras, as he says in his Report he did, is shown by an examination of his letter to Marshal Blücher, and a comparison of that letter with the statement as to the situation and destination at 7 A.M. of the 16th of the different divisions of his army, known as “The Disposition,” drawn up by Sir William De Lancey, the Deputy Quartermaster General, before the Duke left Brussels.[804] 19. That the Duke, in issuing the order for concentrating at Quatre Bras after he had become satisfied that Napoleon was concentrating in front of Blücher, was acting in strict accordance with the demands of the situation, is maintained:[805] but it is shown that it was several hours after Wellington received this information as to Blücher and Napoleon before he issued the order, and that this delay was not only uncalled for, but that it gravely imperilled the success of the allies.[806] 20. It is shown that it is not true that Blüchers decision to fight at Ligny was based on a promise of support from Wellington.[807] 21. Attention is called to the now generally admitted fact that it was not until the early morning hours of the 18th that Blücher was able to give Wellington definite assurance of his support in the battle of Waterloo.[808] 22. The evidence in regard to the story that the Duke rode over to Wavre on the evening of the 17th is given,[809] and, on that evidence, the story is rejected. A few words in conclusion. 1. It does not seem to us that Napoleon can be charged with any lack of activity or decision of character, except on the morning after the battle of Ligny, when he was, as we imagine, pretty well tired out. But his energy speedily returned, and we find him conducting the pursuit of the English during the afternoon, and making an examination of their position in the mud and rain in the middle of the night.