Napoleon had in fact concentrated in front of Fleurus a sufficient force wherewith to fight the Prussians, if, as he thought it not unlikely, they should risk a battle on the next day. He was not apprehensive of the Anglo-Dutch army joining their allies in this battle, for Wellington, as he calculated, could not concentrate in season a sufficient force to overcome the two corps which, under Ney, he intended should occupy Quatre Bras the next forenoon. He had purposely abstained from occupying Sombreffe, for he feared that if he did this, Blücher, finding his communications with Wellington blocked at this point, would retire without a battle, and endeavor to effect a junction with the English at Wavre, or elsewhere to the northward; whereas, so long as the road which connected his army with that of Wellington remained free, Blücher might with confidence be expected to risk a battle for the preservation of that line of communication, that is, at or near Fleurus, with the expectation of being reinforced by his ally. But if he ventured upon this course, Napoleon expected to beat him, for Napoleon calculated that, by the occupation of Quatre Bras the next morning, he could prevent Blücher’s receiving any assistance from his Anglo-Dutch allies. A letter[93] written by Baron Fain, one of the Emperor’s secretaries, to Joseph Bonaparte, dated Charleroi, June 15th, at 9 o’clock in the evening, states that the Emperor has just returned, very much fatigued, having been on horseback since three in the morning, and has thrown himself on his bed for a few hours’ repose; but that he will mount his horse again at midnight. This, however, as we shall see hereafter, he did not do, as at midnight Marshal Ney came to confer with him, having just ridden back from his extreme front at Frasnes. FOOTNOTES: [58] _Ante_, p. 4. [59] Corresp., vol. 28, p. 324, No. 22,052: App. C, I; _post_, p. 362. [60] Ib., vol. 28, p.322, No. 22,050. [61] Ib., vol. 28, p. 323, No. 22,051. [62] Ib., vol. 28, p. 325, No. 22,053: App. C, II; _post_, p. 363. [63] La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 62. [64] Charras, vol. I, pp. 101,117: La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 57, n. _Cf._ Stanhope, pp. 65, 248. [65] Maurice, p. 547: Sept. 1890. [66] For a valuable discussion of Zieten’s conduct, see Col. F. Maurice’s Article on Waterloo in the United Service Magazine for October, 1890. [67] Corresp. vol. 28, p. 330, No. 22,055: Baron Fain to Prince Joseph. [68] But see Grouchy: Observations, pp. 60 _et seq._ [69] Charras, vol. 1, p. 111. [70] Charras, vol. 1, pp. 99, 100. [71] Doc. Inéd., III, p. 22; App. C, III; _post_, p. 366. [72] Ib., V, p. 25; App. C, V; _post_, p. 367. See Napoléon à Waterloo, p. 58. [73] Doc. Inéd., p. 56: Statement of General Reille. [74] Charras, vol. 1, p. 123.