The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History: Third EditionRopes, John Codman
History
The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History: Third Edition
Ropes, John Codman
Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769-1821 -- Elba and the Hundred Days, 1814-1815; Waterloo, Battle of, Waterloo, Belgium, 1815
In the second place, we fail to see that the plan which Rogniat blames
Napoleon for not having adopted, and which Jomini and Charras believe
he really entertained, but failed to carry into effect, that is, the
plan of occupying both Sombreffe and Quatre Bras on the 15th, was an
improvement in any way over Napoleon’s plan as described by himself,
as stated above. These writers would have Napoleon begin the campaign
by separating the two hostile armies by occupying two points on the
road by which they communicated with each other. Napoleon says that
if he had done this, while the two armies would certainly have been
separated, his chances of dealing decisively with one of them, alone
and unsupported by its ally, would most likely have vanished. And the
probabilities are that Napoleon was right in this opinion. Blücher
would naturally have retired, if he had found the Namur-Quatre-Bras
road occupied at Sombreffe by the French in force; he would have tried
to concert with Wellington some combined operation in the neighborhood
of Wavre or Brussels; and thus the opportunity which Napoleon had at
Ligny, where the Prussians were exposed to the attack of the main
French army without the assistance of a single English soldier, would
not have been offered by Blücher.
It seems to us that Napoleon is right in his contention, and that the
great chance which he had at the battle of Ligny of defeating one of
his two adversaries alone and unsupported, was in exact accordance
with his expectations, and, was, as much as such things ever are, the
result of his well-calculated dispositions.
We conclude, therefore, that there is no good reason to suppose
that Napoleon intended on the evening of the 15th to push forward
to Sombreffe and hold the Namur-Nivelles road at that point. He may
very possibly have expected to fix his headquarters at Fleurus,
but, although he did not succeed in doing this, his object had been
substantially attained at the close of the first day of the campaign,
so far as the operations of the right and centre were concerned.
B. Let us now consider the other branch of the question,—Did Napoleon
intend to occupy Quatre Bras on the 15th?
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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