The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History: Third EditionRopes, John Codman
History
The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History: Third Edition
Ropes, John Codman
Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769-1821 -- Elba and the Hundred Days, 1814-1815; Waterloo, Battle of, Waterloo, Belgium, 1815
The Duke of Wellington had been, as had Marshal Blücher, aware for the
last few days of the movement of large masses of French troops near the
frontier, but he had not deemed it necessary or desirable in any way to
alter his dispositions. He felt that his army was the force relied upon
to protect Brussels, where the King of the Netherlands was, and Ghent,
where the King of France was, and that it was of the utmost importance
that Napoleon should not be allowed to gain the political advantage of
putting those newly made sovereigns to flight,[146] and repossessing
himself of Belgium and Holland. Moreover, of the importance of
preserving his own communications with Antwerp and Ostend the Duke was
well aware. He believed that Napoleon’s best move would be against his
communications;[147] and he felt that, under this belief, he ought to
hesitate before concentrating his army and moving it by its left to
gain a union with that of Marshal Blücher.[148]
Hence he retained his own headquarters at Brussels, thirty-four
miles[149] from Charleroi. His army, as has been already stated, lay
in cantonments to the westward of the Charleroi-Brussels turnpike.
It is well known that Wellington looked for a movement of the French
either on the road from Mons to Brussels or to the westward of that
road. He had repaired the fortifications of Mons, Ypres, Tournay and
other places, and put them in a state of defence.[150] It is also to be
observed that for the last three days before the opening of hostilities
the information that came to him of the enemy’s movements indicated a
probable concentration of their forces near Mons.[151] Wellington’s
troops, if they remained in the positions which they occupied on
June 12th, for instance, could be concentrated at Braine-le-Comte
or Hal,—towns on the road from Mons to Brussels,—much more readily
than at Quatre Bras or Gosselies,—that is, they were well situated to
oppose such a movement of the French as that which the Duke thought
it most likely Napoleon would make. They were, it is true, still in
their cantonments, scattered about in the towns and villages, but the
Duke evidently thought that he would have time enough to assemble his
various detachments and concentrate his army after the movements of
his adversary should have been clearly ascertained. For holding this
opinion he has been sharply criticised, but this we will consider in
another place.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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