[190] Lady Jane Dalrymple Hamilton, in her most interesting Journal, now in the possession of her granddaughter, Lady Manvers, says: “We found him [the Duke] there [at the ball] on our arrival at 10 o’clock. * * * We remained till past two, and, when I left, the Duke was still there.” [191] App. C, xiii; _post_, p. 373. [192] _Ante_, p. 82. _NOTES TO CHAPTER V._ 1. We may properly devote a few words here to the Duke of Wellington’s “Memorandum on the Battle of Waterloo,” written in 1842, in reply to Clausewitz’s History of the Campaign of 1815. There are some statements contained in this paper which fairly take one’s breath away. For instance, we learn that the Duke, “having received the intelligence of” the French “attack only at three o’clock in the afternoon of the 15th, _was at Quatre Bras before the same hour on the morning of the 16th_,[193] with a sufficient force to engage the left of the French army.”[194] The fact is, that, at 3 A.M. of the 16th only the brigade of Prince Bernhard of Saxe Weimar was at Quatre Bras, and he had taken it there entirely on his own responsibility, and not, as is implied in the above statement, in obedience to orders from the Duke of Wellington. But it is unnecessary to set forth in detail any refutation of such statements as the above. The best English authorities do not rely[195] on this Memorandum, alleging that the Duke’s memory, when he wrote it, was no longer exact.[196] We are quite within bounds when we say that this Memorandum adds nothing to our knowledge of the facts. We may add that it is a pity that this is so. Wellington wrote this Memorandum in 1842,—twenty-seven years only after the date of the battle of Waterloo. This is not so very long after the occurrence: we are now twenty-nine years after Gettysburg. Very many officers conversant with the facts must have been then alive; and the Duke had access to all the official papers. It is a pity, we repeat, that he did not set himself to the task of drawing up an exhaustive and accurate narrative of the facts of the campaign. 2. We desire to call attention again to the absence of evidence that Wellington and Blücher had formulated any definite plan of concerted action in the event of Napoleon’s invading Belgium.