Colonel Maurice, the most recent military commentator on the campaign, discusses this question, and arrives at the conclusion that Wellington’s original intention of concentrating his army at Nivelles, was in accord with the principles of war.[202] “If there is one thing which rests on more certain experience than another,” says he, “it is that an army ought not to expose itself piecemeal to the blows of a concentrated enemy. Wellington, therefore, contemplated concentrating his army out of reach of the advancing French. Napoleon, from his general knowledge of the position of the English army, assumed that they would, of course, not venture to oppose him till they had fallen back to concentrate. As the case actually happened, only the wild wandering of d’Erlon’s Corps prevented Ney from overwhelming the force in his presence at Quatre Bras.” To this it may be replied:— A. That Wellington, as we have stated above,[203] knew at 11 P.M. of the 15th that the main body of the French under Napoleon in person were concentrating in front of the Prussians, who were themselves concentrating at Sombreffe. He might, therefore, fairly reckon on being able, if he acted with promptness, to assemble at Quatre Bras during the next forenoon a force quite as large as any that might reasonably be expected to be spared from the main body of the French to oppose him. He, therefore, would not have exposed his troops “piecemeal to the blows of a concentrated enemy,” if he had ordered a general concentration at Quatre Bras after making sure that the main body of the French was at or near Fleurus, and that the main body of the Prussians was ready to receive them there. B. It is perfectly true that had d’Erlon’s Corps come up in due time, the forces which Wellington had at Quatre Bras, including the several bodies of reinforcements, as they successively arrived, would have been overwhelmed in detail. But then, as we shall shortly show, Wellington did not issue his orders for his army to concentrate at Quatre Bras in season to effect his object. Had he done so, on the night of the 15th and 16th, he would have had by noon, certainly, a very much larger body of men than he actually did have, very possibly enough to oppose successfully both d’Erlon and Reille. It must be remembered that it was not until (say) 2 o’clock in the morning, or thereabouts, that he gave any orders to any troops to proceed to Quatre Bras.