“The enemy’s position was a strong one; there was no cover of any kind in the desert lying between my camp at Kassasin and the enemy’s works north of the Canal. These works extended from a point on the Canal 1½ miles east of the railway station at Tel-el-Kebir for a distance almost due north of about 3½ miles. The general character of the ground which forms the northern boundary of the valley through which the Ismailia[245] Canal and railway run is that of gently undulating and rounded slopes, which rise gradually to a fine open plateau from 90 to 100 feet above the valley. The southern extremity of this plateau is about a mile from the railway and is nearly parallel to it. To have marched over this plateau upon the enemy’s position by daylight our troops would have had to advance over a glacis-like slope in full view of the enemy and under the fire of his well-served artillery for about five miles. Such an operation would have entailed enormous losses from an enemy with men and guns well-protected by entrenchments from any artillery fire we could have brought to bear upon them. To have turned the enemy’s position either by the right or left was an operation that would have entailed a very wide turning movement, and therefore a long, difficult and fatiguing march, and what is of more importance, it would not have accomplished the object I had in view, namely to grapple with the enemy at such close quarters that he should not be able to shake himself free from our clutches except by a general fight of all his army. I wished to make the battle a final one; whereas a wide turning movement would probably have only forced him to retreat, and would have left him free to have moved his troops in good order to some other position farther back. My desire was to fight him decisively where he was, in the open desert, before he could take up fresh positions more difficult of access in the cultivated country in his rear. That cultivated country is practically impassable to a regular army, being irrigated and cut up in every direction by deep canals. I had ascertained by frequent reconnaissance that the enemy did not push his outposts far beyond his works at night, and I had good reasons for believing that he then kept a very bad look-out. These circumstances, and the very great reliance I had in the steadiness of our splendid infantry, determined me to resort to the extremely difficult operation of a night march, to be followed by an attack before daybreak on the enemy’s position.”