[Footnote 37: Vide St. Augustine, in lib lxxxiii. Qq., quaest. xxii., and St. Thomas, Summa p.1 quaest. xvii, a. 3 ln. c. The words of St. Augustine are, "Omnis qui fallitur, id quo fallitur, non intelligit." Hence the Intellect is always true.] These considerations authorize, or we are much mistaken, the conclusion that the ideas or categories, which the schoolmen hold to be forms of the intermediary or logical world, and Kant to be forms of the subject, are objective and real, and either the intelligible object itself or the objective light by which it is rendered intelligible or knowable. Plato, Aristotle, and the scholastics, if we have not misapprehended them, regard them, in explaining the fact of knowledge, rather as the light which illumines the object than the object itself. Yet, when the object is intelligible in itself, or by its own light, St. Thomas clearly identifies it with the object, and distinguishes it from the object only when the object is not intelligible _per se_. Thus, he maintains with St. Augustine that God knows things _per ideam_; but to the objection that God knows them by his essence, he answers that God in his own essence is the similitude, that is, the idea, of all things: _Unde idea in Deo nihil est aliud quam essentia Dei_. Therefore, idea in God is nothing else than the essence of God. [Footnote 38] [Footnote 38: Summa, p.1, quaest, xv. a. 1 ad 3. The question is _de Ideis_, and we think the reader, by consulting what St. Thomas says in the body of the first article, will agree that, though we have used a different phraseology, we have simply given his sense.]