“A species,” says the author, “is a collection of beings belonging to one and the same genus, but having particular and constitutive properties” (p. 8). Same remark as above: Species, in philosophy, is not a collection, but is “a ratio which can be found in many things, and be predicated of each of them when a complete answer is given to the question, _What is it?_” Species, like genus, is a universal. “Being, the most general genus, is divided into two species, _corporeal_ and _incorporeal_ beings” (p. 8). No philosopher of good reputation has ever considered being as a “genus.” It is known that “being” is above all genus, and accordingly is called “transcendental.” If “being” were a genus, nothing could save us from pantheism. “Science ... is objective, when we consider it as existing in the object contemplated” (p. 9). Can science be considered as existing in the moon? “Art is the application of science to external things according to determined rules” (p. 9). If so, then all artists and artisans should be men of science; which, unhappily, is not true. Art is usually and rightly defined as _Recta ratio factibilium_—“a right method of making anything” with or without the application of science. “Logic is the first part of philosophy—the part which treats of the first efforts of the human mind to discover truth” (p. 17). We think that apprehension, judgment, and reasoning, which are the proper object of logic, are no _efforts_ of the human mind, but very natural and spontaneous operations. “An idea may be considered as existing either in the mind or out of it” (p. 18). It is very improper to give the name of _idea_ to anything out of the mind, as words, gestures, and other outward natural or conventional signs. “Ideas are, first, either true or false. They are true when they conform with their objects, false when they do not. But since this conformity is always with the objects as represented in our minds, and not as they may be in reality, we may, with this explanation, admit the opinion of those who pretend that there are no false ideas” (p. 20). This explanation has no grounds. Ideas are never compared with the objects as represented in our minds. Such a comparison would have no meaning; for the object as represented in our minds is nothing else than a subjective form identical with the idea itself. When philosophers say that _there are no false ideas_, they mean that ideas always conform to their object as it shows itself. This is the common and true doctrine. Even the author himself, probably forgetful of what he had said in this passage, teaches, a few pages later, that “we cannot err in perceiving or in feeling” (p. 23).