“Some existence must have existed before any possibility” (p. 84). We do not like the expression “existence exists,” as we would not like this other, “velocity runs.” Moreover, possibilities are co‐eternal with God; it is therefore incorrect to say that some existence must have existed _before_ them. “Principle is that which contains the reason for the existence of something.... Cause is that which produces something, or which concurs in the production of something” (p. 85). These definitions are very vague and unsatisfactory, to say the least. “The condition is the difficulty to be conquered in order to obtain the effect” (p. 86). By no means. Is the presence of the object a difficulty to be conquered in order to see it? “The end ... has been improperly called the final cause” (p. 87). Why “improperly”? “Modification ... is the substance appearing to us with such or such determined form” (p. 89). Quite absurd. Modification is not the substance, but the accidental form itself, no matter whether appearing or not appearing to us. “Modification cannot exist without substance, nor substance without modification” (p. 90). This proposition is too universal. Would the author admit modifications in the divine substance? “Some authors divide infinite into the infinite _actu_, or the actual infinite, ... and the infinite _potentia_, or the potential or virtual infinite, which can be infinitely increased or diminished. But certainly this division cannot be accepted, since the infinite and a substance which can be increased are two terms involving contradiction” (p. 91). What the author calls “some authors” are all the schoolmen. We put to him the following question: Will the human soul have a finite or an infinite duration? If finite, it must have an end; but, if it has no end, it cannot but be the contradictory of finite—that is, infinite. Yet this infinite duration is successive; it is therefore not actually, but potentially, infinite. Hence the division of the schoolmen can and must be accepted. The author thinks that the potential infinite is not infinite, but indefinite; but surely what has no end is infinite, not indefinite, although it is conceived by us indefinitely, because it transcends our comprehension. The indefinite is not that which has no end, but that of which the end remains undetermined.