The Catholic World, Vol. 20, October 1874‐March 1875Various
Religion
The Catholic World, Vol. 20, October 1874‐March 1875
Various
Catholic Church -- Periodicals
First, the brain is not the measure of the thinking power. The mental
capacity of man, and the thinking power of the soul, are not exactly the
same thing. The first implies both soul and body, the second regards the
soul alone; the first presents to us the musician with his instrument, the
second exhibits only the musician himself. The brain is the organ, the
soul is the organist. You cannot reasonably pretend that the musical
talent, genius, and skill of an organist increase and decrease with the
number and quality of the pipes which happen to be in the organ. All you
can say is that the musical talent of the organist will have a better
chance of a favorable show with a rich rather than with a poor instrument.
The organ, therefore, is not the measure of the ability of the organist,
and the brain is not the measure of the thinking power. Hence from the
fact that the mental capacity of man is enlarged, as you say, in
proportion to the material growth of his brain, we have no right to
conclude that the thinking principle, the soul, grows with the brain; the
right conclusion is that the soul, being in possession of a better
instrument, finds itself in better conditions for the exercise of its
intrinsic power. The organ is improved and the music is better; but the
organist is the same.
Secondly, brain and mind are at present necessarily connected. Does it
follow that therefore the soul cannot have a separate existence? By no
means. If this conclusion were logical, you might on the same ground
affirm also that the body cannot have a separate existence; for the body
is as necessarily connected with the soul as the soul is with the body.
The reason why your conclusion cannot hold is that the connection of body
and soul is necessary only inasmuch as both are indispensable for the
constitution of the human nature. But the human nature is not immortal;
the soul must quit the body when the organism becomes unfit for the
operations of animal life; and therefore the connection of the soul with
the body is not absolutely, but only hypothetically, necessary. The soul
has its own existence distinct from the existence of the body, for the
soul is a substance no less than the body; and therefore it is no less
competent to have a separate existence. You deny, I know, that the soul is
a substance distinct from the body; but what is the weight of such a
denial? What you speculatively deny in your book, you practically admit in
the secret of your conscience whenever you say _I am_. It is not the body
that says _I_; it is the soul: and it is not an accident that perceives
self; it is a substance.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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