The feeling of hunger, you say, is not in the stomach, because “if the nerve uniting brain and stomach be divided, hunger is at an end.” Is not this very curious? Men need none of your theories to know where they feel hungry; and they not only _believe_, as you say, but also _experience_, that their feeling of hunger is in the stomach. How can this be reconciled with your theory? You try to discredit the common belief by observing that we “have no knowledge of physiological processes.” This, however, is not true; for although we may not possess your _speculative_ knowledge of those processes, yet we have an _experimental_ knowledge of them, which beats all your speculations. The simplest common sense teaches that a theory contradicted by facts is worth nothing. Now, the fact is that we experience the sensation of hunger in the stomach, and not in the brain; and therefore no physiological theory that contradicts such a fact can be of any value. You pretend that “habit and external appearance have led to the false notion that we feel in places subjected to external irritation.” This assertion cannot be justified. Habits are acquired by repeated acts; and to assume that habit leads us to a false notion is to assume that we are cheated by our actual sensations; which is inadmissible. As to “external appearances,” it is evident that they have nothing to do with the question, as sensations are not external appearances, but internal realities. Hence when we say that “we feel in places subjected to external irritation,” we express a real fact of which we have experimental evidence, and in regard to which no habit or external appearance can make us err. The fact that “persons who have lost their arms or legs by amputation often feel during their whole life, in atmospheric changes, pains in limbs which they no longer possess,” does not tend to prove that the brain is the exclusive seat of the soul. Hence I dismiss it altogether. With regard to your conclusion that “every part of the body which can be separately perceived must have a corresponding spot in the brain which in some degree represents it in the forum of consciousness,” I have not the least objection against it; I merely add that no part of the body in which the soul is not actually present can be represented in the forum of consciousness. For if the soul is not in the finger when the thorn pricks it, the soul cannot say, _I feel the pain_; it could only say, _I know that a material organ, with which I have nothing to do, is being injured_. The soul would, in fact, but receive a telegram announcing what happens in some distant quarter. If a telegram comes to you from Siberia, announcing twenty degrees of cold, do you feel the sensation of cold?