The Catholic World, Vol. 22, October, 1875, to March, 1876: A Monthly Magazine of General Literature and ScienceVarious
Religion
The Catholic World, Vol. 22, October, 1875, to March, 1876: A Monthly Magazine of General Literature and Science
Various
Catholic Church -- Periodicals
_Fifth question._--“Does the creation of a contingent being in absolute
duration cause any intrinsic change in standing duration?” The answer
is not doubtful; for we have already seen that standing duration is
incapable of intrinsic modifications. Nevertheless, it will not be
superfluous to remark, for the better understanding of this answer, that
the “when” (the _quando_) of a contingent being has the same relation
to the virtuality of God’s eternity as has its “where” (the _ubi_) to
the virtuality of God’s immensity. For, as the “where” of every possible
creature is virtually precontained in absolute space, so is the “when”
of all creatures virtually precontained in absolute duration. Hence the
creation of any number of contingent beings in duration implies nothing
but the _extrinsic_ termination of absolute duration, which accordingly
remains altogether unaffected by the existence in it of any number of
extrinsic terms. The “when” of a contingent being, as contained in
absolute duration, is virtual; it does not become formal except in the
contingent being itself--that is, by extrinsic termination. Thus the
subject of the contingent “when” is not the virtuality of God’s eternity
any more than the subject of the contingent “where” is the virtuality of
God’s immensity.
This shows that the formal “when” of a contingent being is a mere
relativity, or a _respectus_. The formal reason, or the foundation,
of this relativity is the reality through which the contingent being
communicates with absolute standing duration, viz.: the real instant
(_quando_) which is common to both, although not in the same manner;
for it is _virtual_ in standing duration, whilst it is _formal_ in the
extrinsic term. Hence a contingent being, inasmuch as it has existence in
standing duration, is nothing but a term related by its “when” to divine
eternity as existing in a more perfect manner in the same “when.” But,
since the contingent “when” of the creature exclusively belongs to the
creature itself, God’s standing duration receives nothing from it except
a relative extrinsic denomination.
The relation resulting from the existence of a created term in standing
duration consists in this: that the created term by its formal “when”
really imitates the eminent mode of being of God himself in the same
“when.” This relation is called _simultaneousness_.
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