_Sixth question._--“In what does the ‘when’ of a contingent being precisely consist?” From the preceding considerations it is evident that the “when” of a contingent being may be understood in two manners, viz., either _objectively_ or _subjectively_. Objectively considered, the “when” is nothing else than _a simple and indivisible term in duration_ formally marked out in it by the actuality of the contingent being. We say _a simple and indivisible term_, because the actuality of the contingent being by which it is determined involves neither past nor future, neither _before_ nor _after_, but only its present existence, which, as such, is confined to an indivisible _Now_. Hence we do not agree with those philosophers who confound the _quando_ with the _tempus_--that is, the “when” with the extent of flowing duration. We admit with these philosophers that the “when” of contingent things extends through movement from _before_ to _after_, and draws, so to say, a continuous line in duration; but we must remind them that the _before_ and the _after_ are distinct modes of being in duration, and that every term of duration designable between them is a distinct “when” independent of every other “when,” either preceding or following; which shows that the _tempus_ implies an uninterrupted series of distinct “whens,” and therefore cannot be considered as synonymous with _quando_. If the “when” is considered subjectively--that is, as an appurtenance of the subject of which it is predicated--it may be defined as _the mode of being of a contingent thing in duration_. This mode consists of a mere relativity; for it results from the extrinsic termination of absolute duration, as already explained. Hence the “when” is not _received_ in the subject of which it is predicated, and does not _inhere_ in it, but, like all other relativities and connotations, simply connects it with its correlative, and intervenes or lies between the one and the other. But, although it consists of a mere relativity, the “when” still admits of being divided into _absolute_ and _relative_, according as it is conceived absolutely as something real in nature, or compared with some other “when”; for, as we have already explained when treating of ubications, relative entities may be considered both as to what they are in themselves, and as to what they are to one another.