During those weeks on the Aisne we were at a great disadvantage because we had so few heavy guns capable of coping with those of the Germans, and because we were hopelessly outnumbered in machine guns, of which the enemy seemed to have an endless supply. On 23rd September some heavy batteries arrived from England, and enabled us to make some sort of reply; but for every shell fired by our guns the enemy fired twenty. We also suffered greatly from German spies. Disguised as peasants, they infested our lines, and as they mingled with the villagers and refugees it was very difficult for our soldiers to detect them. Frequently women were discovered acting as secret agents. On 25th September a disaster befell the 1st Cameron Highlanders. They had suffered heavily during the retreat and in the action on the 18th, in which they lost 17 officers and over 500 men. On the 25th they were sent to relieve the Black Watch, and took over their battalion headquarters in one of the caves which occur in the chalk of the plateau. During the morning a German shell blew in the roof of the cave, and buried the inmates. A few were rescued, but the fire of the enemy was so fierce and continuous that it was not until evening that a party of Royal Engineers was able to dig out the remainder. Five officers and thirty men were found to be dead. No British regiment suffered so severely in the first two months of the war as the Camerons. The British casualties during the fighting between 12th September and 8th October were very heavy. Sir John French estimated that in killed, wounded, and missing we lost 561 officers and 12,980 men. Most of these losses were incurred during the advance of the First Corps on 14th September. Great as these losses were, those of the Germans were still greater. It is said that not less than 50,000 Germans were put out of action in one way or another during the fighting on the Aisne. * * * * * Do you remember the famous interview between Sir Edward Goschen and Herr von Jagow on the evening of Tuesday, August 4, 1914?[132] In that interview the Kaiser's Secretary of State revealed the German plan of campaign. He explained that the Germans were forced to advance into France by way of Belgium because it was a matter of life and death to them to strike a decisive blow at the French as soon as possible. "If they had gone by the more southern route, they could not have hoped, in view of the fewness of the roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition, entailing great loss of time." Let us look for a moment at this strong chain of fortresses, which the Germans were unwilling to attack because the necessary operations meant delay. [Illustration: The Barrier Fortresses of France.]