[Footnote 2: Wang Shih-chieh, _Pi-chiao Hsien-fa_, Shanghai, XXVI (1937), p. 651-3.] The Emergency Party Congress of the Kuomintang, Hankow, March 29-April 1, 1938, provided for two further amendments to the Party Constitution. It abolished the system of reserve members, and, far more significantly, it created the post of _Tsung-ts'ai_, here translated Party Chief, which was indistinguishable except as a matter of terminology from the post of _Tsung-li_, held in perpetuity by Sun Yat-sen. Chiang K'ai-shek was elected Party Chief, and the powers of his office were stated to be duplicates of those given originally to the _Tsung-li:_ a general provision that "all members shall follow the direction of" the _Tsung-li_, which was not implemented; chairmanship of the Party Congress and of the Central Executive Committee (_a fortiori_, of the Standing Committee of the C.E.C.); and a veto over the acts of the Congress and the C.E.C. Furthermore, the Political Committee (Central Political Council) was replaced by the Supreme National Defense Council, of which Chiang was also elected Chairman. Since Chiang had been Chairman of the Standing Committee, it follows that the change of formal labels did not much alter the constitutional organization of the Kuomintang, nor materially change Chiang's position. Chiang does not help to create machinery of power in order to lurk behind it, thus proclaiming it a mere façade. He, as a public servant reared in the Confucian tradition, possesses sufficient respect for words to let them mean what they are publicly declared to mean. The post of _Tsung-ts'ai_ is more than ample in providing Chiang with the power he feels necessary to accomplish national unification, mitigate social injustice, and promote serious representative government. He accepts the full measure of his power; doing so publicly, his subsequent actions appear relatively modest. By Western standards, Chiang is naive enough to be honest. A point brought out in connection with the National Government (p. 46, above) is worth reiteration. Neither by Party action nor by governmental change has the Kuomintang monopoly of political power been modified by law. There is no United Front, Popular Front, or any other kind of front in the legal system; even in practical administration, the entrance of non-Party men has been at Party direction; and it is only in the Special Areas, the special war services, and the military organization that the Kuomintang has relaxed its control of power. Other groups are sharing in the work of the People's Political Council. The prudence of such a policy may appear open to question; its consistency is not. PARTY ORGANIZATION