The character of Chiang as a political leader which emerges from his military training, his successful marriage and even more successful jockeying for power, his maturity under the influence of that power, and his somewhat crude but austere recognition of responsibility, is quite different from the portraits drawn by the coastal diehards or by Leftists. To the former he is just another Asiatic swashbuckler who conceals murder and extortion behind orotund banality; to the latter he is a sort of Franco, supinely cooperative with Anglo-American imperialism because of his compradore-class mentality, who faces a last chance of dialectical salvation if he yields to the Chinese Communists in their version of democracy and promotes upper-class liquidation in war time. It is likely that he will break the limits of either attempt to define him, and will--if the war succeeds--play a distinctly Chinese part in the construction of a China which, by reason of the speed of technological progress coupled with the rising extent of governmental economics, will break through the ruinous Right-Left pattern of Western politics. Chiang probably has enough awareness of Chinese history to realize that as the founder of an enduring democratic system his prestige would exceed that obtainable by any process of dictatorship. If he becomes a dictator, he will have successors; but as first President of a real democracy, he would be eternally unique, and as _de facto_ founder of a great power, a world figure for this century. Against his desire to let democracy grow beneath his military aegis, his conservatism of habit and his anxiety to get things done right continue to militate; but there is thirteen years' evidence to show that he has tried very hard to work within the limits of the constitutional system of the National Government, has avoided arbitrariness as much as he thought possible, and has at worst behaved like a Salazar, Atatürk, or Pilsudski. CONCLUSION The China of Chiang K'ai-shek has withstood the shock of foreign war, and has demonstrated its capacity to grow and survive as a state despite heavy domestic adversity. The constitutional structure nears a condition of realistic operation. The political organs, while still monopolized by the Kuomintang, are highly effective; their unrepresentative character is mitigated by the new experiments with consultative legislation. Administratively, both as to special functions and in developing local government, significant new enterprises are under way. Communist-Nationalist rivalry, while still bitter, has avoided domestic civil war during the invasion; despite the clash of National troops with the New Fourth Army, the postponement may be indefinitely continued. Taken all together, Free China presents a hopeful picture; and it therefore acquires international importance as the presumptive predecessor of a great Asiatic democracy.