to the idea that Jesus is for Protestant liberalism a kind of "demonstration of God" (80), and he adds himself: "It may indeed be that our conception of the significance of Jesus has often been expressed unskilfully enough. It may be that in discourses, lectures, or other popular ways of speaking something is at times said which may be so clumsily put as to give occasion for such things to be said." Indeed, he himself maintains regarding Jesus: "Whoever places the ideal of his life in him, he experiences God in him" (84). He also finds that the desire for God of the Jews, Greeks, Semites, and Germans "could be stilled in him." Taking into account these expressions and the whole tone which it pleases Herr Weinel to adopt towards the opponents of his standpoint, it appears time to remind him once again of E. v. Hartmann's "Die Selbstzersetzung des Christentums" (it is obvious he has only a third-hand acquaintance with the author whose point of view he calls Neo-Buddhism, counting him among the supporters of the morality of pity!) and especially of the chapter on "Die Irreligiosität des liberalen Protestantismus." Here, in connection with the lack of metaphysics displayed by liberal Protestantism (and admitted even by Weinel) and the latter's principle of love, he says: "If we transform the whole of religion into Ethics and soften down the whole of Ethics into love, we thereby renounce everything that is in religion besides love, and everything which makes love religious. We thereby confess that the impulse of love is raised into religion since religion properly so called has been lost. It is true religion is not a shark, as the inquisitors thought, but at the same time it is not a sea-nettle. A shark can at least be terrifying, a sea-nettle is always feeble." Liberal Protestantism, as Hartmann sums it up, consists "of a shapeless, poor, shallow metaphysic, which is concealed as far as possible from critical eyes; of a worship successfully freed from all mystery, but one that has become thereby by no means incapable of being objected to; of an Ethics forcibly separated from Metaphysics and on that account irreligious. It rests upon a view of the world which by its worldliness and optimistic contentment with the world is by no means in a position to give birth to a religion, and which sooner or later will allow the remnants of religious feeling which it brought with it to be smothered in worldly ease." [511] Op. cit., 39. [512] Cf. E. v. Hartmann, "Die Selbstzersetzung des Christentums und die Religion der Zukunft," 2nd ed., 1874, especially chaps. vi. and vii. [513] Cf. W. v. Schnehen, "Der moderne Jesuskultus," 2nd ed., 1906; also "Naumann vor dem Bankerott des Christentums," 1907. [514] Cf. my work, "Die Religion als Selbstbewusstsein Gottes," 1906, 199 sq. [515] Cf. my work, "Die Religion als Selbstbewusstsein Gottes," in which the attempt has been made to form a general religious view of the world in the sense mentioned.