‘As to my first argument, it plainly appears, that the malice of our adversary is incorrigible, seeing that he had not any authority over the deceased; for, according to the laws and decrees, as well as to reason and the holy Scriptures, no one can put another to death without authority from the judge or judicial. Otherwise, any one may slay another at his pleasure, and tumults and confusion would reign without any chief or head, and every one would alternately, when strongest, make himself king. ‘So far was our adversary from having any power or authority over my lord of Orleans that he was bound to do him honour and reverence as son to a king, and to call him his lord, and respect him in his words and actions, for such are the privileges and prerogatives belonging to the sons of kings. This usurpation, therefore, of authority is apparent in our adversary, and consequently his wickedness has been unjustly perpetrated. ‘That authority is required as essential to enable any one to put another to death appears clearly in many parts of the holy Scriptures: and in fact, St Austin, when discussing the saying of our Lord, in the 26th chapter of the gospel of St Matthew,‘Omnis qui gladium acceperit, gladio peribit;’ that is, Whosoever useth the sword shall perish by the sword; adds, ‘All who shall, without lawful authority, make use of the sword, or shall arm himself against another, is bold in his wickedness.’ He afterwards asserts, that even a malefactor cannot be put to death without lawful authority; for in his Civitas Dei, ‘Qui, inquit, sine publica administratione maleficum interfecerit, velut homicida judicabitur.’ That is, Whoever shall slay a malefactor without the forms of public administration of justice shall be judged guilty of murder. This the law confirms, ‘Vigor, inquit, publicus tutela in medio constituta est, ne quis de aliquo, etiam sceleribus implicato sumere valeat ultionem:’—which is, That the public strength is as a defence constituted and ordained to prevent any one from taking vengeance, even upon him who is involved in great and abominable crimes. ‘In truth, the advocate for our adversary may say, that the laws should only take cognizance of such as act contrary to law; and that as a tyrant proceeds directly in opposition to them, he will affirm that this murder is no way contrary to the law. Alas! and does the advocate of our opponent know that my late lord of Orleans was a tyrant? Who is the judge that declares him such? ‘The fallacy of this assertion must be strictly examined, for on this deception is founded the supposition of my lord being a tyrant; and as our adversary groundlessly asserts, that the late duke of Orleans was a tyrant in the eye of reason, he concludes that it was lawful to put him to death. Let us, however, consider the properties of tyranny, and who should be accounted tyrants.