Kant talks of "making the empirical intuition of a house into a perception, by apprehension of the manifold contained therein," and says that "the _necessary unity of space_ and of my _external sensuous intuition_ lies at the foundation of this act." The "manifold" contained in an "empirical intuition"--take the stone we have used for an example--is simply the diversity of "properties," constituting the object--the color, texture, size, weight, and the rest of them; and these properties are "effects of sense." Every one of them is a relation to subjectivity, a result of impact _on_ subjectivity, and is in the _object_ only as reflecting or _re_-presenting there the sensuous nature of a _subject_. But these various "effects on various senses," these merely subjective separates--how do they _get united_ into _one thing_? What constitutes the unity of sensuous manifolds? Every phenomenon being an essential plurality--a lot of "sense-effects"--what closes together the various effects on various human senses, called the properties of a stone, into the one phenomenal object, the stone itself. To this end there must be some common subjective ground of those subjective things, "effects on sense." There must be some subjective unity in which those subjective pluralities all merge, for only as _merged_ do they get to be an _object_. Now, a common subjective ground of various effects on various senses can only be a common _awareness of them_--a _synthetical unity of apprehension_, or just instinctive, automatic consciousness in the germ. This must be common to all the senses together, and to each sense separately. What, for example, is seeing, but the simple awareness of sight? What is touch, but the simple awareness of feeling? What is any "intuition," which means any taking-in of any phenomenon, but a common awareness, however rudimental or developed, of some conjoined diversity of effects on sense?