Thus, while space is pure synthesis of apprehension _ex_-ternally objected, time is the same pure synthesis of apprehension _in_-ternally objected. CHAPTER XIV. CREATIVE MIND FURTHER PROBED. The inmost secret of the universe lies in Kant's four words, "the synthesis of apprehension," or what he more elaborately termed "the transcendental synthesis of the image-making faculty." "It is an operation [he says] of the understanding on sensibility, and the _first_ application of the understanding to objects of possible intuition, and at the same time _the basis for the exercise of the other functions of that faculty_." It has been intently presented to view in these pages, because it focalises and explains the whole law of scientific idealism, and is the one most important as well as abstruse fact in the genesis of things. But having duly dealt with this point, it must now be said that "the synthesis of apprehension," _alone_ and _ungrown_, is altogether inadequate to give form to an object, in the full import of that word. For an _object_ is something held distinct by itself, in connection with another object, or with various objects. "_Unconscious_ understanding" cannot form such connection and distinction, but can only blindly manufacture single intuitions, affording at most what Kant termed "a rhapsody of perceptions," in which no one would be first or last, or anything at all when past. A fish-worm, perhaps, has such a "rhapsody of perceptions" for its objective world. In the world of man the _a priori_ element of intelligence which shapes it must be objected in the phase of consciousness proper, or "apperception," as well as "simple apprehension." In noting the difference between the synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of apperception, Kant said: "It is one and the same spontaneity which, at one time under the name of imagination, at another under that of understanding, produces conjunction in the manifold of intuition." "Apperception" is simply apprehension _apprehended_, or mind adequate to self-conception and so to conceptions in general. That there can be a stone, as known to a _human being_, there must be a synthesis of sense-effects (its properties), in which they are distinguished among themselves, and of which objects as wholes are distinguished from each other. A synthesis of this kind presupposes not merely "unconscious understanding," but understanding that recognizes _itself_ in connecting all things else.