The Close of the Middle Ages, 1272-1494, 3rd Ed.Lodge, Richard, Sir
History
The Close of the Middle Ages, 1272-1494, 3rd Ed.
Lodge, Richard, Sir
Middle Ages
These events in Castile encouraged Charles V. to carry out a
long-cherished design for the reconquest of the English [Sidenote:
Renewal of English war.] provinces. A pretext for a rupture was found in
the discontent which was excited in Aquitaine by the heavy taxes levied
by the Black Prince to defray the expenses of his Spanish expedition. In
1368 several of the Gascon nobles, regardless of the treaty of Bretigni,
appealed to Charles V., as their suzerain, to redress their grievances.
Charles delayed a final rupture until he had made his preparations, and
had heard of the triumph of his ally in Castile. In 1369 he summoned the
Black Prince to appear in Paris to answer the complaints of his subjects
before the court of peers. Edward replied grimly that he would willingly
go to Paris, but with sixty thousand men in his company. It was easier,
however, to utter the threat than to carry it out. The conditions which
had enabled the English to gain some conspicuous successes in the
earlier war were now altered, and to some extent reversed. The wise
government of Charles V. had already removed many of the administrative
evils which had crippled France under his grandfather and his father.
Thanks to du Guesclin, the French king could now put into the field a
professional army under capable leaders, in place of the disorderly
feudal levies which had been cut to pieces at Crecy and Poitiers. The
Black Prince was no longer the active and resolute commander that he had
shown himself before his illness, and he lost some of his most capable
lieutenants, notably Chandos, who died in 1370. The provinces ceded at
Bretigni had had some years’ experience of English rule, and their
discontent was stimulated by a growing sense of national sympathy with
the rest of France. Another very prominent cause of the reversal of
military success in the years following 1369 is to be found in the
cautious tactics deliberately adopted and enforced by Charles V.
himself. For an invading army victory is imperatively necessary; for the
defenders it is enough not to be defeated. Charles forbade his generals,
no matter what provocation they received, to risk an engagement in the
open field. They were to shut their troops in the strong towns, and to
leave the English armies to be wasted by disease, by want of provisions,
and by the difficulty of coercing a [Sidenote: English disasters.]
hostile population. As the invaders departed, the French could harass
their march, cut off stragglers and supplies, and occupy the territory
which the enemy was compelled to evacuate. These tactics were eminently
successful, and they were immensely aided by the support of the
Castilian fleet, which enabled the French to gain a temporary naval
ascendency. This deprived the English of direct communication with the
coast of Aquitaine, and forced them to carry on military operations at a
disastrous distance from their ultimate base of supplies. Almost the
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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