The collected works of William Hazlitt, Vol. 04 (of 12)Hazlitt, William
Philosophy
The collected works of William Hazlitt, Vol. 04 (of 12)
Hazlitt, William
English essays -- 19th century
It may be proper to observe, in the first place, that Mr. Malthus by
making vice and misery the necessary consequences of his favourite
principle lays himself open to a very obvious objection. For if he means
to prove any thing by his theory, the question immediately is, what
degree of vice and misery is rendered necessary by this principle, or by
the _physical constitution of man_? Are we to suppose that only so much
evil is necessary as naturally grows out of the British constitution? Or
does this principle also prove that all the evils that are suffered
under the Turkish government, or that were suffered under the old
government of France, or that may arise out of its present government
are equally necessary and salutary? How far are we to go? Where are we
to stop? Are we to consider every evil and abuse as necessary, merely
because it exists, or only as much of the thing as we cannot get rid of?
But how much can we really get rid of? Are vice and misery uniformly
owing to the development of this principle in certain situations, or are
they to be in part ascribed to the intervention of other arbitrary, and
gratuitous causes, the operation of which may be more easily set aside?
In what manner are we to distinguish between what is necessary, and what
is not? All these questions require to be asked before we can proceed to
build any practical conclusions on Mr. Malthus’s theory of the evils of
population. The vague, general term, ‘vice and misery,’ gives us no
clue. It is mere cant; and applies equally to the best and worst of all
possible governments. It proves either nothing, or it proves a great
deal more than I conceive Mr. Malthus would in all cases wish to prove
by it.
There is no species of vice or oppression that does not find a ready
excuse in this kind of reasoning. And besides, by leaving the quantity
of vice and misery always uncertain, we never subject ourselves to the
necessity of following a general principle into any obnoxious
conclusions; and are always at liberty to regulate our opinions
according to our convenience by saying—I would have no more vice and
misery than at present prevails: but that degree of vice and misery
which is inwoven with the present constitution of things, I would by no
means have removed, it might endanger the whole fabric. This is a double
advantage. We thus sacrifice to the powers that be, without violating
decorum, or being driven off our guard by an inflexible and pedantic
logic. I have so good an opinion of Mr. Malthus that I do not think he
has any predilection for vice and misery in the abstract, or for their
own sakes: I do not believe he would stand forward as the advocate of
any abuses from which he himself does not reap some benefit, or which he
may not get something by defending.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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