The collected works of William Hazlitt, Vol. 11 (of 12)Hazlitt, William
Philosophy
The collected works of William Hazlitt, Vol. 11 (of 12)
Hazlitt, William
English essays -- 19th century
ideas or sensations in our minds, can be no reason why we should suppose
matter or corporeal substances, since that is acknowledged to remain
equally inexplicable with, or without this supposition. If therefore it
were possible for bodies to exist without the mind, yet to hold they do
so, must needs be a very precarious opinion; since it is to suppose,
without any reason at all, that God has created innumerable beings that
are entirely useless, and serve to no manner of purpose.
‘But say what we can, some one perhaps might be apt to reply, he will
still believe his senses, and never suffer any arguments, how plausible
soever, to prevail over the certainty of them. Be it so, assert the
evidence of sense as high as you please, we are willing to do the same.
That what I see and hear, and feel, doth exist, _i.e._ is perceived by
me, I no more doubt than I do of my own being: but I do not see how the
testimony of sense can be alleged as a proof for the existence of any
thing which is not perceived by sense. We are not for having any man
turn sceptic, and disbelieve his senses; on the contrary, we give them
all the stress and assurance imaginable, nor are there any principles
more opposite to scepticism than those we have laid down, as shall be
hereafter clearly shown. Secondly, it will be objected that there is a
great difference between real fire, for instance, and the idea of fire,
betwixt dreaming or imagining oneself burnt and actually being so: if
you suspect it to be only the idea of fire which you see, do but put
your hand into it, and you’ll be convinced with a witness. This and the
like may be urged in opposition to our tenets. To all which the answer
is evident from what hath been already said, and I shall only add in
this place, that if real fire be very different from the idea of fire,
so also is the real pain that it occasions very different from the idea
of the same pain, and yet nobody will pretend that real pain either is,
or can possibly be, in an unperceiving thing or without the mind, any
more than its idea.’
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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