As to the other position, that we have no general ideas, but that it is the terms only that are general and abstract, Mr. Tooke has borrowed this piece of philosophy from Mr. Locke, who borrowed it from Hobbes. ‘Universality’ says Mr. Locke, as quoted by our author, ‘belongs not to things, which are all of them particular in their existence. When, therefore, we quit particulars, the generals that rest are only creatures of our own; their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into of signifying or representing many particulars.’ I have, however, before shown how very loose, uncertain, and wavering, Mr. Locke’s reasoning on this subject is, though I cannot agree with Mr. Tooke that it is therefore ‘_very different from that incomparable author’s usual method of proceeding_.’ There is one question which may be asked with respect to this statement, which, if fairly answered, will perhaps, decide the point in dispute: _viz._ if there is no general nature in things, or if we have no general idea of what they have in common or the same, how is it that we know when to apply the same general terms to different particulars, which on this principle will have nothing left to connect them together in the mind? For example, take the words, _a white horse_. Now say they, it is the terms which are general or common, but we have no general or abstract idea corresponding to them. But if we had no general idea of _white_, nor any general idea of _a horse_, we should have nothing more to guide us in applying this phrase to any but the first horse, than in applying the terms of an unknown tongue to their respective objects. For it is the idea of something general or common between the several objects, which can alone determine us in assigning the same name to things which, considered as particulars, or setting aside that general nature, are perfectly distinct and independent. Without this link in the mind, this general perception of the qualities of things, the terms _a white horse_ could no more be applied, and would, in fact, be no more applicable to animals of this description generally, than to any other animal. In short, what is it that ‘puts the same common name into a capacity of signifying many particulars,’ but that those particulars are, and are conceived to be of the same kind? That is, general terms necessarily imply a class of things and ideas. Language without this would be reduced to a heap of proper names: and we should be just as much at a loss to name any object generally, from its agreement with others, as to know whether we should call the first man we met in the street by the name of John or Thomas. The existence and use of general terms is alone a sufficient proof of the power of abstraction in the human mind; nor is it possible to give even a plausible account of language without it. But Mr. Tooke has on all possible occasions sacrificed common sense to a false philosophy and epigrammatic logic.