The collected works of William Hazlitt, Vol. 11 (of 12)Hazlitt, William
Philosophy
The collected works of William Hazlitt, Vol. 11 (of 12)
Hazlitt, William
English essays -- 19th century
The modern metaphysical system assumes as its basis that the operations
of the intellect are only a continuation of the impulses existing in
matter; or that all the thoughts and conceptions of the mind are nothing
more than various modifications of the original impressions of things on
a being endued with sensation or simple perception. This system
considers ideas merely as they are caused by outward impressions acting
on the organs of sense, and excludes the understanding as a distinct
faculty or power from all share in its own operations.
The following is a summary of the general principles of this philosophy
as they are expressly laid down by Hobbes, and by the latest writers of
the French school.
1. That our _ideas_ are copies of the impressions made by external
objects on the senses.
2. That as nothing exists out of the mind but matter and motion, so it
is itself with all its operations nothing but matter and motion.
3. That thoughts are single, or that we can think of only one object at
a time.
4. That we have no general nor abstract ideas.
5. That the only principle of connection between one thought and another
is association, or their previous connection in sense.
6. That reason and understanding depend entirely on the mechanism of
language.
7 and 8. That the sense of pleasure and pain is the sole spring of
action, and self-interest the source and centre of all our affections.
9. That the mind acts from a mechanical or physical necessity, over
which it has no controul, and consequently is not a moral or accountable
agent.—_The manner of reasoning upon this last question is the only
circumstance of importance in which Hobbes differs decidedly from modern
writers._
10. That there is no difference in the natural capacities of men, the
mind being originally passive to all impressions alike, and becoming
whatever it is from circumstances.
Except the first, all of these positions are either denied or doubtfully
admitted by Mr. Locke. It is, however, his admission of the first
principle, which has opened a door directly or indirectly to all the
rest. The system of Kant is a formal and elaborate antithesis to that
which bears the name of Locke, and it is built on ‘the _sublime_
restriction (as Madame de Staël expresses it) added by Leibnitz to the
well-known axiom _nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu_—NISI
INTELLECTUS IPSE.’
It is in the manner of proving this restriction, and of explaining this
word, _the intellect_, that the whole question depends, and to this I
shall devote another letter.
AN ENGLISH METAPHYSICIAN.
THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED
_The Morning Chronicle._] [_Feb. 17, 1814._
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account